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ABSTRACT

*

The situation in Syria has the potential to become a pivotal
moment in the development of the law of armed conflict (LOAC).
The ongoing brutality serves as a reminder of the importance of
extending internationalhumanitarianregulation into the realm
of non-internationalarmed hostilities; however, the very chaos
those hostilitiesproduce reveals critical fault lines in the current
approach to determining the existence of an armed conflict. The
international community's year-long reluctance to characterize
the situation in Syria as an armed conflict highlights a clear
disparity between the object and purpose of the LOAC and the
increasingly formalistic interpretation of the law's triggering
provisions. Focusing on Syria, this Article critiques the overly
technical approach to the definition of non-internationalconflict
currently in vogue-based on Prosecutor v. Tadi6's framework of
intensity and organization-andhow this approach undermines
the original objectives of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
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Conventions. This overly legalistic focus on an elements test,
rather than the totality of the circumstances, means that the
world has witnessed a retrogradeof internationalhumanitarian
efficacy: Syria appears to be a lawless conflict like those that
inspired Common Article 3-the regime employs its full combat
capability to shell entire cities, block humanitarianassistance,
and target journalists and medical personnel directly. The
LOAC is specifically designed to address exactly this type of
conduct, and yet the discourse on Syria highlights the dangers
of allowing over-legalization to override--and underminelogic, resultingin a deleterious impact on human life.
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In a war zone, some buildings are obvious targets-command
centers, weapons depots, enemy hideouts-and some are not, like
schools, hospitals, media centers. But in the battle for Syria, where rules
of war do not apply and where civilians are facing a savage massacre,
the house that served as a makeshift press center in the rebel district of
Bab Amr is ground zero. Destroying that target would go a long way
toward allowing the regime of BasharAssad to flatten the entire enclave
without the whole world watching.

Vivienne Walt, Escape from Syria, TIME INT'L, Mar. 19, 2012.

The world has watched for over a year as President Bashar alAssad's armed forces have employed unrestrained and overwhelming
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combat power against the most recent uprising of the Arab Spring. 1
What began as tens of thousands of unarmed protesters marching in
the face of bullets and artillery shells has turned into a seemingly
unending struggle between the regime's opponents-protesters,
dissident army units, and other fighters-and the military forces
loyal to the regime. 2 The unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from
reports emanating from Syria is that the government's tactic of choice
has been to indiscriminately and relentlessly attack entire towns,
villages, and cities in an attempt to terrorize opponents and thereby
repress the uprising once and for all.
Massive human suffering associated with heavy-handed
government response to internal dissident threats is nothing new;
indeed, the images coming from Syria are unfortunately reminiscent
of many previous "internal" armed conflicts. From the Spanish Civil
War to Sierra Leone to Rwanda to Sudan, internal wars have
showcased the most heinous acts humans can commit. The brutality
and human suffering associated with these conflicts spurred one of
the most important evolutions in international law during the
twentieth century: the extension of international humanitarian
regulation into this realm of sovereign authority. Since the advent of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the international community has
steadily expanded and reinforced the application of the law of armed
conflict (LOAC) to situations of internal armed violence to regulate
state and opposition conduct for the clear and imperative purpose of
mitigating the suffering inevitably associated with these situations,
especially suffering inflicted on innocent civilians and opposition
forces who have been rendered hors de combat.3 Today, it is simply
axiomatic that the LOAC regulates the conduct of hostilities and the
protection of persons during all armed conflicts, whether inter- or
intra-state.
As important as this development has been for limiting the
suffering associated with war, it is equally axiomatic that the LOAC
does not apply unless a situation rises to the level of armed conflict.4
Accordingly, the increasingly robust package of international
humanitarian protections the law mandates is not triggered if the
facts on the ground do not support an objective, fact-based

See generally JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG.
1.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE (2012) (discussing the background of the conflict up to July 2012).

See id. at 1 ("Despite international efforts to broker a cease-fire, by the
2.
summer of 2012 government and opposition forces have been engaged in all-out armed
conflict.").
3.
See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing the motivations
behind the inclusion of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing a range of
4.
considerations in identifying the threshold of armed conflict for the application of the
LOAC).
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determination of armed conflict. Furthermore, because of its treaty
foundation and the relatively recent role of international criminal
jurisprudence assessing when this law applies, the meaning of armed
conflict has become increasingly legalistic. Indeed, this shift in
emphasis from a practical and pragmatic factual assessment to a
legalistic "test" is reflected in what many today apply as an
"elements" test: unless certain proposed elements are independently
satisfied, a situation cannot be designated an armed conflict, even
when the totality of the facts and circumstances cry out for
international humanitarian legal regulation. The unfortunate effect
of this evolution from practical to legal is that the international
community seems incapable of seeing the humanitarian forest for the
trees.
The current situation in Syria has the potential to become a
pivotal moment in the development of the law of conflict recognition.
The ongoing brutality reminds the world of the importance of
extending international humanitarian regulation into the realm of
non-international armed hostilities; however, the very chaos produced
by those hostilities reveals critical fault lines in the current elements
approach to determining the existence of an armed conflict. From
almost the very inception of the government response to the Syrian
opposition, most people, if asked to describe what was happening in
Syria, would have used terms such as war, conflict, hostilities, or
something comparable. Indeed, it is almost incomprehensible that
those caught up in the chaos and violence-government soldiers,
dissident fighters, innocent civilians, journalists, foreign observerswould seriously question the assertion that they were involved in a
"war." And yet the international legal discourse evinced a clear
reluctance to acknowledge the existence of armed conflict until the
legalistic elements test was apparently objectively satisfied, in the
summer of 2012, at least fifteen months after the violence erupted.5
Prior to this point in time, the international community spoke of
massive human rights violations, repression, even massacres-but
not of war or armed conflict. 6 This reluctance highlights a clear

5.
In a 2012 operational update, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) reported:
The ICRC concludes that there is currently a non-international (internal)
armed conflict occurring in Syria opposing Government Forces and a number of
organised armed opposition groups operating in several parts of the
country . . . . Thus, hostilities between these parties . . . are subject to the rules

of international humanitarian law.
Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort Amid Increased
Fighting, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS (July 17, 2012), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-07-17.htm.
6.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/253, 1 2-4, U.N. Doc. A/66/L.36 (Feb. 14, 2012)
("Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in the Syrian Arab
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disparity between the object and purpose of the LOAC and the
increasingly legalized and formalistic interpretation of the law's
triggering provisions in relation to non-international hostilities. This
is especially discouraging in light of the motivation for adopting the
armed conflict trigger: to mitigate the impact of technical legal
formulas when determining the applicability of humanitarian
protections.7
Before 1949 and the drafting of the Geneva Conventions (the
Conventions), international law contained no positive law applicable
to internal conflicts, and as these conflicts were perceived as
occurring within the zone of state sovereignty, minimal authority
existed for the applicability of customary regulatory norms.8 The
inclusion of Common Article 3 in those Conventions, which imposed
limited but critically important standards of conduct on participants
in internal conflicts, was revolutionary. This unprecedented intrusion
into state sovereignty was motivated by the recognition that the
brutality associated with internal conflict necessitated the imposition
of an international obligation to respect, at a bare minimum,
fundamental humanitarian principles at the core of the laws and
customs of war.9 The need for respect for these principles-focused
principally on protecting individuals who never took or are no longer
taking an active role in hostilitiesto-was equally logical regardless of
whether the conflict was internal or interstate in nature."
Accordingly, Common Article 3 reflected a simple premise: armed
conflict, whether internal or international, triggers international

Republic, in particular the ongoing human rights violations and use of violence by the
Syrian authorities against its population . . . .").
7.
See 3 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], GENEVA CONVENTION:
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR: COMMENTARY 19-23 (Jean S.

Pictet ed., 1960) (discussing the use of the term "armed conflict" rather than "war" as a
means to minimize law avoidance).
8.

See EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 32 (2008)

("Civil conflicts were generally thought to fall within the reserved domain of each state.
The state was free to decide on the means to restore peace and order."); see also
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

384, T 15.1.2 (2004) ("In the past, the application of the law of armed conflict was
largely dependent on 'recognition of belligerence."').
9.
See 4 ICRC, GENEVA CONVENTION: RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR: COMMENTARY 26, 44 (Oscar M. Uhler & Henri
Coursier eds., 1958) (discussing the historical motivations behind the inclusion of
Common Article 3).
10.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (mandating
protections for "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause").
11.
See id. (binding parties "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties").
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legal regulation.1 2 As the states that adopted the 1949 Conventions
understood so well, any other approach would leave the protection of
individuals detrimentally impacted by the brutality of internal armed
violence to the whims of the state, a situation already considered
untenable by 1949.13

In 1949, the drafters of the Conventions sought to have the law
apply as broadly as possible to conflicts occurring between states and
nonstate entities in order to maximize its effectiveness and reach.14
In 1994, the first case before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) set forth a comprehensive definition of
armed conflict, specifically defining non-international armed conflict
as "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."15 At
the time, the ICTY emphasized again the need for a broad and
comprehensive application of the LOAC in order to fulfill the object
and purpose of the law.1 6 Over time, the two key factors that the
ICTY identified-the intensity of the fighting and the organization of
the parties-have morphed into a highly technical test for the
definition of non-international armed conflict, a test ostensibly
requiring independent satisfaction of both elements before a situation
of armed conflict may properly be recognized.' 7 This "elements test,"
which has gained substantial momentum in international legal
discourse, requires satisfaction of each element as an independent
requirement, instead of understanding them as factors in a totality
assessment.1 8 This development undermines the original objective of
Common Article 3. Focusing on the events in Syria, this Article
critiques how what was originally conceived as an analytical

See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 26 ("The same logical process [of extending
12.
legal protections to different categories of persons during international armed conflict]
could not fail to lead to the idea of applying the principle to all cases of armed conflict,
including internal ones.").
13.
LA HAYE, supra note 8, at 38 ("The Spanish Civil War and its catalogue of
violations made states aware of the necessity to adopt some treaty norms dealing with
means and methods of warfare in civil wars, but real developments were not possible
until after the second World War."); see also Matthew White, Wars of the Twentieth
Century, HIST. ATLAS TWENTIETH CENTURY, http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warlist.htm (last updated Jan. 1999) (noting that the estimated numbers of people killed in
civil wars during the interwar years are 8,800,000 in the Russian Civil War (19181921), 2,500,000 in the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), and 365,000 in the Spanish
Civil War (1936-1939)).
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 36 (emphasizing the need for "the scope of
14.
application of [Common Article 3 to be] as wide as possible").
15.
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
16.
See id. $$ 67-70 (holding that the LOAC applies throughout the entire
territory of state where the conflict is taking place and until a general conclusion of
fighting is reached).
17.
See infra Part II.B.
18.
See infra notes 126-134 and accompanying text.
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framework morphed into an overly legalistic elements test for the
recognition of the existence of non-international conflict and how this
evolution undermines the original concept and purpose for
recognizing the existence of non-international armed conflicts.
The impact of this strict elements test was apparent in an early
report by the UN Commission of Inquiry for Syria. In stating that the
situation in Syria did not constitute an armed conflict, the
Commission of Inquiry explained that the opposition parties in Syria
were not sufficiently organized to satisfy this test.19 The effect was
that the world witnessed a retrograde of international humanitarian
efficacy: Syria appeared objectively to be a lawless conflict like those
that inspired the adoption of Common Article 3-one in which the
regime employed its full arsenal of combat capability to shell entire
cities and neighborhoods at will, block the provision of humanitarian
assistance, and target journalists and medical personnel directly. The
LOAC is specifically designed to address exactly this type of
situation. Core LOAC principles related to both the conduct of
hostilities and humanitarian protections developed over time to
mitigate the suffering inherent in situations involving widespread
and intense hostilities. 20 Human rights law-the exclusive source of
international legal regulation applicable in the absence of an armed
conflict-simply does not contemplate massive uses of military power
and therefore does not provide an effective regulatory framework for
such use. For example, human rights law does not seek to balance the
need to utilize deadly combat power with humanitarian concerns
inherent in the principle of military necessity, nor does it include
obligations for "parties to a conflict" to facilitate humanitarian relief
organization access to areas engulfed in hostilities or respect those
exclusively engaged in the collection and care of the wounded and
sick. 21 Equally significant are the increasingly robust mechanisms for

19.
See U.N. Gen. Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 13, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012) ("While the commission is gravely concerned that the
violence in certain areas may have reached the requisite level of intensity, it was
unable to verify that the Free Syrian Army (FSA), local groups identifying themselves
as such or other anti-Government armed groups had reached the necessary level of
organization.").
20.
See generally Geoffrey S. Corn & Laurie R. Blank, The Laws of War:
Regulating the Use of Force, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW IN THE NEWS: A GUIDE FOR
JOURNALISTS, SCHOLARS AND POLICYMAKERS 97 (Paul Rosenzweig et al. eds., 2012)
("War, or armed conflict, has been subject to regulation since it became an organized
societal endeavor."); Gregory P. Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of Armed
Conflict Priorto World War II, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 176 (2000) (discussing the historical
development of the LOAC from ancient times up to World War II).
21.
These obligations appear in core LOAC treaties and documents, including
the Lieber Code and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. See, e.g., FRANCIS LIEBER,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD,

arts. 14, 16 (1898) (providing the first codified statements of the principle of military
necessity and its application during conflict); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
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imposing international criminal responsibility for violations of
international humanitarian law during non-international armed
conflicts that have resulted in, at least in practical terms, a more
effective accountability regime for war crimes than for human rights
violations. 2 2
Syria is therefore a symbolic and painful reminder of why the
drafters of the Conventions recognized a need to distinguish internal
disturbances resulting in an exclusively government law enforcement
response from situations that necessitate a government response with
military force utilizing tactics and weaponry inconsistent with a law
enforcement characterization-namely armed conflict. 23 This dividing
line is inherent in Common Article 3. Although this provision imposes
only humanitarian protections and does not address regulation of the
means and methods of warfare (military tactics and weaponry), the
dividing line it establishes demonstrated a recognition that these
protections are essential to offset the humanitarian consequences
attendant to the employment of a state's combat capabilities to
repress an internal threat. Quite simply, Common Article 3 evinced
the recognition that states need no "test" to decide to employ a heavyhanded military response to internal challenges. Instead, what was
needed was an international standard to ensure that when such force
is unleashed, the participants in the hostilities become bound to
respect the most fundamental norms of international humanitarian
law. 24
Indeed, the most obvious distinction between peacetime and
wartime (armed conflict) is the legal authority to employ deadly force.
During war, armed forces employ lethal force against enemy

of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; GC III,
supra note 10; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. For an
overview of human rights law and the differences from the LOAC, see generally
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
(1989).
See, e.g., U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
22.
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT 76-77 (2011) (noting, for example,

that few human rights treaties contain provisions regarding the criminalization and
prosecution of human rights violations); see also LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P.
NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 591 (2013) (referencing the number

of prosecutions, convictions, and acquittals at the ad hoc tribunals).
23.
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1354-55 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,

1977) (discussing the exclusion of situations of internal disturbances from the
application of the LOAC).
24.
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 26 (noting the importance of legal regulation
in internal, or non-international, armed conflicts).

2013/

LOSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES

707

personnel and objects as a first resort. 25 In contrast, the peacetime
authority to use force-regulated by international human rights
principles-restricts lethal force to a measure of last resort permitted
only based on individualized threat determinations. 26 In theory,
therefore, the absence of armed conflict obligates governments to
limit security response to internal threats to the more restrictive
parameters of constabulary use of force authority consistent with
international human rights law, which would therefore provide
greater protection to civilians from government violence. It is an
unfortunate reality, however, that an overly restrictive interpretation
of when armed conflict arises results in a different demarcation line:
one not between the application of human rights law and the LOAC,
but between the LOAC and no law at all. As highlighted by the
opening quote, the primary concern generated by the early phases of
the current Syrian civil war was not "peacetime vs. wartime," but
"wartime vs. totally unrestrained brutality."
Acknowledging this reality necessitates a reconsideration of how
armed conflict recognition has evolved in recent years, and whether
this evolution is inconsistent with the type of pragmatic trigger for
application of the LOAC's regulatory framework that is essential for
balancing military reality and humanitarian protections. If this
evolution provides the legal space for the type of paralysis that
marked the initial international legal reaction to the violent
government response to Syrian opposition, it is ultimately
inconsistent with the primary objective of Common Article 3 and the
broader corpus of today's law applicable to non-international armed
conflicts: aligning the reality of armed hostilities with humanitarian
protections developed to apply in such situations. As we explain,
Syria therefore reinforces exactly why this is so and why the strict
elements test increasingly relied on for recognition of armed conflict
detracts from the law's applicability precisely when it is most needed.
In Part I, this Article analyzes the LOAC's object and purpose
with respect to non-international armed conflicts and highlights the
goals of the drafters of the Geneva Conventions in establishing a
pragmatic triggering mechanism for the application of the law. In
particular, this Part demonstrates why a broad conception of noninternational conflict is essential to contain the brutality historically
endemic during these conflicts and why the nature of the government
response to an internal challenge has always been and must remain a

Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of
25.
Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT'L HUM. LEGAL STUD. 52, 7475 (2010) (highlighting that "the legitimate application of deadly force as a measure of
first resort against operational opponents during armed conflict [is] a distinction
reflected in the regulatory norms of the LOAC").
See id. at 76 ("Thus, the state actor is only permitted to employ deadly force
26.
when no lesser means will effectively reduce a direct and specific threat, producing a
use of deadly force as a last resort requirement.").
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key indicator of the existence of armed conflict. This analysis
highlights and helps recall what the framers of Common Article 3
contemplated when they created this extraordinarily important
treaty provision.
Part II traces the evolution of non-international armed conflict
"recognition," specifically focusing on the ICTY Appeals Chamber
opinion in Prosecutor v. Tadid and how that opinion evolved into an
elements test as the result of subsequent ICTY and other
jurisprudence and scholarly interpretation. The rigidity of what is
today known as the elements test fails to effectuate the underlying
objective of conflict identification, especially in the internal hostilities
context. The story of conflict recognition-or lack thereof-in Syria
provides a compelling example of the consequences of this rigidity.
Finally, Part III demonstrates how a totality of the
circumstances approach better serves core LOAC objectives of
humanitarian protection. Rather than inflexible independent
requirements, the Tadi6 factors should serve as a conceptual
guidepost for a totality approach to assessing the existence of noninternational armed conflict and how to distinguish such conflicts
from lower level types of internal violence insufficient to trigger the
LOAC, such as civil disobedience, riots, and other types of internal
disturbances. In support of this argument, an analogy to U.S.
constitutional criminal jurisprudence offers an intriguing insight into
the very different outcomes of these two approaches to conflict
identification.
This Article proceeds on the belief that the LOAC's object and
purpose provide the essential foundation for properly understanding
the intensity and organization factors, how they relate to each other
and combine to indicate existence of armed conflict, and for
recognizing how other factors, such as the government's response,
affect the analytical impact of these factors. Together, these layers of
analysis demonstrate the need for a conceptual-rather than
technical-framework guided by the object and purpose of the law.
The current discourse on Syria highlights the dangers of allowing an
overly technical test to override-and undermine-logic, with an
obviously deleterious impact on human life. A more flexible totality of
the circumstances approach to conflict identification-one that relies
heavily on the Tadi6 factors but utilizes them to guide a much more
pragmatic factual assessment-will contribute to fulfilling the
humanitarian goals so central to the original inclusion of Common
Article 3 in the 1949 Conventions.
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I. WHY THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (LOAC) REGULATES NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

In the aftermath of World War II, the international community
aimed to enhance humanitarian protections for war victims by
revising the Geneva Conventions.2 7 Three Geneva Conventions that
had been in force during the war were updated, and one entirely new
Convention was created. 28 Th6 states that came together for this
important revision process shared a collective motivation: to close the
numerous gaps and loopholes exposed during the cataclysmic events
of World War II in order to better achieve the humanitarian
objectives of international law.2 9 These efforts culminated in the four
1949 Geneva Conventions, each of which addressed the plight of a
distinct category of war victims (the wounded and sick in the field;
the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea; prisoners of war; and
civilians).3 0 These four treaties have since earned the distinct status
of universal ratification and unquestionably form the very foundation
of international humanitarian law.3 1
Of the many lessons learned in the "battle laboratory" of
twentieth century conflicts culminating with World War II-lessons
that inspired the revisions to the Conventions-two were especially
significant. First, human suffering associated with armed hostilities,
or de facto war, is not limited to conflicts between states, but is often
even more pervasive during civil war and other intrastate
hostilities. 32 Second, without a clear and pragmatic trigger for
application of treaty provisions developed to provide humanitarian
protection to war victims, even the most comprehensive treaty regime
is functionally meaningless.3 3
Each of these lessons reflected the delta between de facto war
and de jure war. While it may seem axiomatic that international legal

27.
See, e.g., Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47
Stat. 2021 (July 27, 1929); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field (July 6, 1906), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/180?OpenDocument; Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (Aug. 22, 1864), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/120?opendocument.
28.
See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN
OPERATIONAL APPROACH 33-65 (2012); 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that the
Fourth Geneva Convention "is a new one, ... provid[ing] civilians at long last with the
safeguards so cruelly lacking in the past").
See generally 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 3-6 (highlighting the challenges the
*29.
ICRC faced in protecting civilians during World War II).
See GC I, supra note 21; GC II, supra note 21; GC III, supra note 10; GC IV,
30.
supra note 21.
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, ICRC, CUSTOMARY
31.
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES, at xv (2005).

4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 27.
32.
33.
See 3 ICRC, supra note 7, at 19-20 (explaining how the drafters of the
Geneva Conventions sought to minimize law avoidance).
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regulation of war is applicable to any situation that manifests the
obvious indicia of war-armed hostilities between belligerent groups
seeking to impose their will on each other-in reality, no such
pragmatic synchronization existed prior to 1949.34 Civil wars were
not considered wars in the international legal sense because of the
absence of an interstate contest.3 5 Accordingly, the law developed to
regulate war was inapplicable to these intrastate, or internal,
hostilities. This was in large measure a consequence of the dormancy
of the historically effective concept of belligerency, a concept that
extended international legal regulation to belligerent parties in civil
war. 36 In those situations, belligerent recognition of a dissident group
resulted in the imposition of international rights and obligations as if
the entity were a state.37 However, the recognition of belligerent
status fell victim to an increasingly bipolar world, resulting in the
politicization of what had previously been a predominantly de facto
doctrine.3 8 Failing to acknowledge belligerent status resulted in a
troubling lacuna in international legal regulation of large-scale
internal conflicts, such as the one in Spain that claimed upwards of
500,000 lives.39 Conflicts such as the Spanish Civil War
unquestionably satisfied any pragmatic definition of warwidespread and intense hostilities between belligerent groups.
However, the political hobbling of the doctrine of belligerency coupled
with the absence of an internationally defined and binding standard
for determining compulsory applicability of the law of war (a term
that is today synonymous with humanitarian law or the LOAC) left
this category of hostilities immune from international legal
regulation. 40

34.
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 27 (noting the resistance of states to
recognizing internal violence as armed conflict subject to international regulation).
35.
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 74-75 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1952) (arguing that the "Law of Nations" mandates that only "full sovereign States
alone possess the legal qualifications to become belligerents" and that "half and part
sovereign States are not legally qualified to become belligerents").
36.
See, e.g., Yair M. Lootsteen, The Concept of Belligerency in International
Law, 166 MIL. L. REV. 109, 109-41 (2000).
37.
Id. at 109.
38.
Id. at 115-16.
39.
See HUGH THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1961).
40.
See Lootsteen, supra note 36, at 115-17, 123 (analyzing the impact of the
Spanish Civil War on the development of Common Article 3). See generally ANTONY
BEEVOR, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1982). During this period, brutal internal conflicts in
other states, such as Russia and China, challenged this customary expectation that
professional armed forces engaged in armed conflict would conduct themselves in
accordance with principles of disciplined warfare. The estimated numbers of people
killed in civil wars during the interwar years are 8,800,000 in the Russian Civil War
(1918-1921), 2,500,000 in the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), and 365,000 in the
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Matthew White, 30 Worst Atrocities of the 20th
Century, HIST. ATLAS TWENTIETH CENTURY, http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/atrox.htm
(last updated Dec. 2004).
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In response, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions included in
each of the four treaties articles dictating situations of treaty
applicability.4 1 The undisputed purpose was to create a de facto
standard for determining the applicability of Geneva law, a standard
that would more effectively protect victims of war by preventing
definitional law avoidance and hopefully nullify the corrosive effect of
political agendas in assessing law applicability. As a result, the focal
point for determining applicability would no longer be war-a term
susceptible to interpretive avoidance-but instead armed conflict. 4 2
Accordingly, Article 2 common to the four treaties (Common Article 2)
required application of the full corpus of the treaties to any
international (interstate) armed conflict. 43 And, in response to the
humanitarian risk associated with armed hostilities in the purely
intrastate context, all four treaties also included an article imposing
limited international humanitarian obligations on parties engaged in
non-international armed conflicts: Common Article 3.44 While the

See, e.g., GC I, supra note 21, art. 2; GC III, supra note 10, art. 2.
41.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 20; see also Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Farley,
42.
CharacterizingU.S. Operationsin Pakistan:Is the United States Engaged in an Armed
Conflict?, 34 FORD. INT'L L.J. 151, 160 (2011) ("Notably, the Geneva Conventions
adopted the term 'armed conflict' specifically to avoid the technical legal and political
pitfalls of the term 'war."'); Sylvain Vitk, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International
Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 69, 70 (2009)
("Whereas a narrow formalistic concept of war was predominant initially, the reform of
the system with the revision of the Geneva Conventions in 1949 gave precedence to a
broader approach, based on the more objective concept of armed conflict.").
See GC II, supra note 21, art. 2 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to
43.
all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties . . . ."); see also Vito, supra note 42, at 70-71.
Common Article 3 states:
44.
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
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textual effect of each of these treaty provisions only related to the
Conventions themselves, they evolved over time to represent the
definitive standard for assessing LOAC applicability to these two
categories of armed conflict (and indeed ushered in the concept of
non-international armed conflict as a distinct type of conflict). 45
This did not, however, eliminate all uncertainty from law
applicability analysis. Instead, the focal point of that uncertainty
shifted from the meaning of the term war to the meaning of the term
armed conflict.46 Determining that meaning was never particularly
complicated in the context of interstate hostilities, or international
armed conflicts. Relying principally on the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to Common Article 2, any
hostilities between the regular armed forces of two or more states
resulting from an interstate dispute qualified as an international
armed conflict, triggering the full corpus of the Conventions and, by
implication, the LOAC writ large.4 7 The non-international context,
however, proved far more complex.
Extending international humanitarian regulation to situations of
internal hostilities certainly seemed justified by the brutality that
defined those struggles. However, it also represented an intrusion
into an area until then considered to be the exclusive domestic
sovereignty of the state. Precisely when this intrusion becomes
justified may be obvious at the extreme-e.g., the types of civil war
like the one in Spain, involving widespread and large-scale "force on
force" battles between two traditional armies. But as the nature of
the internal violence moves down the scale of intensity and involves
opposition forces lacking the type of traditional military organization
typical of the classic civil war, the line between armed conflict and
civil disturbance becomes uncertain. Because internal civil
disturbances below the threshold of armed conflict were viewed as
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
GC III, supra note 10, art. 3
45.
See INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S SCH.,
LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 25-34 (Brian J. Bill ed., 2000); see also Vit6, supra
note 42, at 70-94 (analyzing the range of types of armed conflicts).
46.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 20; Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon and the
Regulation of Armed Hostilities: The Need To Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed
Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 295, 304 (2007) (noting that "uncertainty has
developed regarding the application of [the non-international armed conflict] prong of
the legal trigger" for armed conflict).
47.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 20 ("Any difference arising between two States
and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a
state of war."). Uncertainty can persist even in the context of international armed
conflict, however. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Sharon G. Finnegan, America's Longest Held
Prisoner of War: Lessons Learned from the Capture, Prosecution, and Extradition of
General Manuel Noriega, 71 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1114-20 (2011).
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matters of domestic sovereignty, 4 8 identifying this demarcation point
was in 1949, and remains today, a key source of uncertainty-a
49
reality painfully illustrated by the recent brutal events in Syria.
A. ContainingBrutality

It is, of course, self-evident that one way to contain or limit the
brutality of warfare is to prevent warfare itself. Efforts to achieve this
important humanitarian goal have and must continue to be a central
focus of much of international law and diplomacy, irrespective of the
"character" of the potential conflict.5 0 However, over time the branch
of the law intended to mitigate the risks associated with the
inevitable failure of these efforts-the jus in bello or the LOAC-has
also become an important source of law that contributes to this
purpose. At its most basic conception, applying a strict and oftentimes
difficult legal equation to determine the existence of armed conflict
enables international disavowal of the denial of humanitarian
protections in those situations even when the pragmatic metrics "on
the ground" indicate otherwise. 5 ' The motivation for this approach is
almost certainly a desire to limit the consequences of armed
hostilities by preventing states or nonstate groups from legitimately

See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 27 ("In a civil war the lawful Government, or
48.
that which so styles itself, tends to regard its adversaries as common criminals.").
Id. at 30-37.
49.
League of Nations Covenant art. 12 ("[T]hey agree in no case to resort to
50.
war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial
decision. . . ."); U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 2, para 4; Treaty Providing for the
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, 94 L.T.N.S. 57.
Interestingly, this theory runs directly counter to the drafters' fundamental
51.
goal of eliminating "law avoidance" with regard to interstate hostilities. The ICRC's
Commentary to the Convention explains:
By its general character, [the first] paragraph deprives belligerents, in
advance, of the pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their
obligations. There is no need for a formal declaration of war, or for recognition
of the existence of a state of war, as preliminaries to the application of the
Convention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.
It remains to ascertain what is meant by "armed conflict". The
substitution of this much more general expression for the word "war" was
deliberate. It is possible to argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of
"war". A State which uses arms to commit a hostile act against another State
can always maintain that it is not making war, but merely engaging in a police
action, or acting in legitimate self-defence. The expression "armed conflict"
makes such arguments less easy.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 20. See also Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the
Scope of InternalArmed Conflict in InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 183 MIL. L. REV.
66, 85 (2005) ("[I]t is worth emphasizing that recognition of the existence of armed
conflict is not a matter of state discretion.").
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claiming the broad powers associated with armed conflict. 52 As
laudable as this may be, it is both inconsistent with the underlying
rationale of the Geneva Convention conflict recognition framework
and produces a negative operational and humanitarian impact.53
Nothing in the Commentary to Common Article 3 suggested that
a primary or even secondary function of this landmark development
was to limit resort to armed hostilities. 54 Instead, the Commentary
confirms that the drafters intended the article to be a highly
pragmatic humanitarian remedy to the reality that armed conflicts,
especially in the intrastate context, would manifest themselves in
diverse and often unpredictable permutations, more amenable to a
totality of the circumstances assessment than a technical legal
assessment. 55 The goal was clear: maximize applicability of
international humanitarian protection for victims of these historically
brutal conflicts.56
The current discourse, which considers the applicability of the
LOAC solely as a distinguishing line from the peacetime regime of

52.
See INT'L LAW AsS'N [ILA], THE HAGUE CONFERENCE: FINAL REPORT ON THE
MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-4, 25-26 (2010) (arguing that
while the United States has engaged in armed conflicts within Iraq and Afghanistan, it
has not engaged in a larger, global armed conflict with terrorist forces); see also Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Defining Armed Conflict, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 393, 394-95
(2009).
See infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
53.
54.
Indeed, by .1949, the strict separation between the jus ad bellum-the law
governing the resort to force and the central paradigm for efforts to outlaw war-and
the jus in bello was firmly entrenched and an important aspect of the equal application
of the LOAC during armed conflict. As the U.S. Military Tribunal V stated in the
Hostage Case:
Whatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and whether or no[t]
the cause be a so-called just cause, the same rules of international law are valid
as to what must not be done, may be done, and must be done by the
belligerents themselves in making war against each other. ...
"The Hostage Case," in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS: "THE HIGH COMMAND CASE"'TTHE HOSTAGE CASE" 759, 1247
(1950) (quoting 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM & ARTHUR WATTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 174
(1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
55.
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 35-36 (noting that the drafters of the
Conventions abandoned the idea of listing specific conditions for recognizing the
existence of non-international armed conflict and that "the scope of application of the
article must be as wide as possible").
56.
See id. at 34 (explaining that Common Article 3 was designed to be simple
and clear, making application automatic without the need to consider the complexities
of different types of conflicts); LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
32 (2002) (explaining how a restrictive definition of armed conflict can lead to a
restrictive reading of Common Article 3); see also Rogier Bartels, Timelines, Borders
and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide Between Internationaland
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 35, 38 n.9 (2009)
(describing how Professor Erik Castren, an attendee at the Diplomatic Conference of
1949, characterized the lack of a definition of armed conflict not of an international
character as a deliberate choice to prevent a limited reading of Common Article 3).
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human rights law and domestic law enforcement mechanisms, simply
fails to account fo'r the LOAC's historic purpose of mitigating the
humanitarian suffering inherent in warfare, especially internal
warfare. As far back as the Old Testament, leaders and societies
imposed some limitation on the conduct of hostilities; these early
regulations were directed at reducing the violence visited on certain
groups, such as women and children, or prisoners. 57 The founding of
the ICRC itself was a response to the horrors of war and an effort to
introduce a measure of humanity into the brutality of combat and to
mitigate wartime suffering. 58 Throughout this long stretch of history,
international human rights law did not exist, of course. The LOAC
thus functioned as the primary-in fact, the exclusive-restraint on
the imposition of violence as a tool of policy.
Today, sixty-plus years after the modern human rights
movement began with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
this historic and central purpose of the LOAC has faded from the
discourse, overtaken by concerns about identifying the demarcation
line between the peacetime regime of law enforcement regulation
pursuant to human rights norms and the regulation of hostilities
pursuant to the LOAC.5 9 Unfortunately, however, Syria demonstrates
all too tragically that the potential for unmitigated cruelty and
brutality has not faded commensurately. The result is a failure to use
the tool of LOAC for one of its key purposes. Thus, the international
community must not forget that just as LOAC's applicability
threshold identifies the dividing line between peacetime law and
wartime law, so the application of LOAC equally represents the even
more fundamental demarcation between law and no law at all,
between a measure of humanity and wholly unmitigated brutality.
Ignoring this reality has too high a price in human suffering.
Furthermore, this reluctance to identify armed conflict in the
context of a situation in which peacetime paradigms are insufficient
produces a gap in legal protection and obligation: in essence, an
invitation to unrestricted warfare. The LOAC is historically adamant
in its rejection of gaps in the law, for the basic reason that gaps
inherently undermine LOAC's central goals of protecting civilians
during hostilities and minimizing the suffering inherent in war.60

57.
See, e.g., HOWARD LEVIE, TERRORISM AND WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 9
(1993) (citing Numbers 31:7-12; Deuteronomy 3:6-7, 20:14-17; 1 Samuel 15:3) (noting
that the Old Testament contains "numerous admonitions for, and records of, the
slaughter of the captured men, the transplanting of the women and children, the
plunder of beasts and other property, the looting and wanton destruction of cities,
etc."); Noone, supra note 20.
58.
See Hans Haug, Afterword to HENRY DUNANT, A MEMORY OF SOLFERINO 30,
131-33 (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 1986) (1862).
59.
Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
60.
LOAC's concern with comprehensive application can be found in numerous
areas, such as the foundational principle of equal application of the law, see Adam

710

VANDFRBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:693

Allowing a situation that produces a consequential gap in legal
protection and regulation simply runs counter to LOAC's very object
and purpose. Equally problematic is the loss of a fairly wellestablished regime of international criminal accountability for
violations of these core norms of armed conflict. 6 1 While it is not
inconceivable that widespread human rights violations may result in
international criminal responsibility, 62 it remains a reality that the
accountability structure associated with violations of international
humanitarian law is much more predictable-a factor that must
inevitably impact deterrence in those situations.
It may be true that the international community should be
reluctant to acknowledge situations of armed conflict if and when
that reluctance serves as a deterrent to a heavy-handed government
response to internal oppositions threats. Unfortunately, there seems
to be little evidence indicating such an impact. Instead, state forces
exploit the legal uncertainty of these situations in their attempts to
deal decisive blows to emerging threats. 63 Common Article 3's

Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle Under Pressure, 90
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 931 (2008), or in the insistence that all persons merit some
protection under the law, regardless of the nature of their status or position. The ICRC
Commentary thus notes:
In short, all the particular cases we have just been considering confirm a
general principle which is embodied in all four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law:
he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical
personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is
no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. We feel
that that is a satisfactory solution-not only satisfying to the mind, but also,
and above all, satisfactory from the humanitarian point of view.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 51.
61.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (imposing individual
criminal liability for war crimes in internal armed conflicts); Lindsay Moir, Grave
Breaches and Internal Armed Conflicts, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 763, 765-66 (2009)
(discussing International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and ICTY cases that impose
individual criminal liability for actions taken during internal armed conflicts).
62.
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for Summonses To Appear, IT 56-57 (Mar. 8, 2011), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl037052.pdf (issuing summonses to the accused
due to their reasonable likelihood of committing crimes against humanity); Rep. of Int'l
Comm. of Inquiry Mandated To Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the Events of
28 September 2009 in Guinea, transmitted by letter dated Dec. 18, 2009 from the U.N.
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, f 266, U.N. Doc. S/2009/693
(Dec. 18, 2009) (recommending that due to the deficiencies of the Guinean justice
system, situations involving crimes against humanity should be referred to the
International Criminal Court).
63.
See JIM NICHOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34613, STABILITY IN RUSSIA'S
CHECHNYA AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1
(2010) (describing Russia's use of military sweep operations in targeting Chechen
resistance).
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drafters seemed to recognize this risk, leaving the definition of armed
conflict to the pragmatic metrics of each situation. 64 Unless and until
it is established that linking conflict regulation to the strict elements
approach currently in vogue actually inhibits resort to combat power
by governments responding to internal threats, the underlying
totality approach reflected in the Commentary should prevail. The
goal must be constant: synchronize the applicability of conflict
regulation with the reality of armed conflict and actively avoid any
law-based disavowal of those realities.

B. What Role for the Government's Response?
This reminder of the LOAC's core purpose highlights the need to
allocate substantial weight to the nature of the state response to
emerging internal opposition threats when assessing LOAC
applicability. As Syria demonstrates, failing to account for a state's
wholly unrestrained use of force as the method of repressing internal
opposition creates a genuine -risk of legal uncertainty and
humanitarian catastrophe, precisely when such certainty is most
needed. The Geneva Conventions' trigger for LOAC application rests
on an objective and pragmatic framework, seeking to divorce
applicability from the rhetoric of states. 65 Just as Common Article 2's
paradigm for international armed conflict eliminates the opportunity
for states to engage in law avoidance by creating an objective trigger
untethered to declarations of war or other public pronouncements, so
Common Article 3 also introduced the same objective approach to
internal armed conflict. 66 Internal violence is fundamentally a threat
to the government's authority; therefore, analyzing how the
government responds to that violence must be a major component of
any objective determination. 6 7 At the same time, the nature of the
government's actions cannot be the determinative or exclusive
component, for the very reason that the Conventions substituted the
term armed conflict for war: any trigger for the law that rests solely
on governmental rhetoric or action will lose that essential
objectivity. 68 To better understand how and when to incorporate the
nature of the government's response into the conflict recognition

64.
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 35-36 ("The idea [of listing certain conditions
for the application of Common Article 3] was finally abandoned-wisely, we think.").
65.
See id. at 20 (noting that "[i]t is possible to argue almost endlessly about
the legal definition of 'war,"' but "the expression 'armed conflict' makes such arguments
less easy").
66.
See, e.g., Anthony Cullen, supra note 51 ("[It is worth emphasizing that
recognition of the existence of armed conflict is not a matter of state discretion.").
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 35 (listing one relevant criterion as "[t]hat the
67.
legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against
insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national territory").
68.
See id. at 20 (noting that the Convention would apply even in the absence
of a formal declaration of war in the presence of "de facto hostilities").
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analysis, it is important to examine how this consideration was
viewed at the time Common Article 3 was drafted.
The ICRC Commentaries to the Conventions offered what has
always been understood as a series of important factors to guide noninternational armed conflict identification-the critical distinction
between civil disturbance below the threshold of armed conflict and
the type of internal violence that crosses that threshold and triggers
humanitarian regulation.6 9 The Commentary to Common Article 3
emphasized that no factor or combination of factors should be
considered dispositive. Instead, it seems apparent that a totality of
the circumstances analytical approach was proposed, requiring a true
case-by-case analysis of each individual situation.70 Perhaps more
importantly, this assessment was to be guided by the very
motivational purpose of establishing international humanitarian
regulation for non-international armed conflicts: maximizing
application of Common Article 3.71 Why, the Commentary queried,
would anyone object to its application? "What Government would
dare to claim before the world, in a case of civil disturbances which
could justly be described as mere acts of banditry, that, Article 3 not
being applicable, it was entitled to leave the wounded uncared for, to
torture and mutilate prisoners and take hostages?"7 2 Even in the
"close call" situation, the result of recognizing the existence of an
armed conflict merely required the humane treatment of individuals
who no longer posed a threat to the state-an obligation equally
applicable in peacetime. 73
What the Commentary failed to recognize when it posed this
question, however, was that crossing the threshold from peacetime
civil disturbance to internal armed conflict triggers not only the
humanitarian protections of Common Article 3, but also a range of
robust state powers justified only in the context of an armed conflict,
most significantly the power to kill as a first resort based on status
presumptions.7 4 Perhaps this was implicitly recognized by the

69.
See, e.g., id. at 35-36.
70.
See id. (noting that the conference "wisely" abandoned developing a list of
conditions to define the term conflict).
71.
See id. (emphasizing that scope of application "must be as wide as
possible").
72.
Id. at 36. Tragically, reports from Syria demonstrate precisely this conduct.
See, e.g., Pro-Assad Forces Reportedly Kill over 220 in Assault on Syrian Village, HAARETZ
(July 13, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/pro-assad-forces-reportedlykill-over-220-in-assault-on-syrian-village-1.450789 (Isr.) (describing wounded and bodies
in fields, houses, and rivers after a government attack on the town of Taramseh).
73.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 36 ("[N]o Government can object to observing, in
its dealings with internal enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it and
them, a few essential rules which it in fact observes daily, under its own laws, even
when dealing with common criminals.").
74.
Corn, supra note 25, at 93 (noting that unlike human rights law, the LOAC
authorizes the use of deadly force as a first resort based on the presumption that
belligerent operatives are offensive based on their membership in the enemy forces);
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Commentary's emphasis on the significance of state resort to regular
armed forces as a factor indicating the existence of armed conflict. If
it is assumed that the use of the armed forces will involve the
employment of combat power normally associated with war, then it
does indeed suggest the existence of armed conflict, for the simple
reason that the armed forces called upon to respond to the internal
opposition threat would implicitly invoke LOAC authority in the
execution of their operations.75
This is not, however, a universally valid assumption. States
routinely utilize regular armed forces to augment law enforcement
efforts, and many states maintain permanent national military
police, or gendarmerie.7 6 Thus, the answer to the Commentary
question is clear: objection to an expansive application of Common
Article 3 does not necessarily reflect opposition to imposing an
international legal obligation on the state to ensure the humane
treatment of inoffensive individuals; it reflects opposition to the
premature and unjustified use of LOAC powers by a state to address
an internal crisis.77 This is certainly a legitimate concern. However,
what does not seem to have been adequately considered in
contemporary conflict recognition discourse is whether a strict legal
test for the existence of armed conflict-a test substantially more
demanding than the totality approach proposed by the Commentary
to Common Article 3-achieves this objective.
Perhaps if it could be established that states are increasingly
hesitant to unleash the full force and effect of their military
capabilities to respond to nascent internal opposition threats because
they do not believe the elements of armed conflict are satisfied, this
shift from a totality to a more juridical approach would have merit.
This, however, is a highly dubious proposition. Instead, limiting
recognition of armed conflict through a strict elements test may
produce the exact opposite effect of exposing victims of hostilities to
increased brutality as the result of the legal regulatory uncertainty-

ILA, supra note 52, at 4 (noting that certain rights, including the right to kill enemy
combatants as a measure of first resort, are only available in armed conflict).
75.
See Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric T. Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A
Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81
TEMPLE L. REV. 787, 819 (2008) (concluding that because the Commentary noted that
the deployment of armed forces is a factor in determining whether Article 3 applies, the
nature of government response is a significant indicator of the existence of armed
conflict).
76.
Gendarmeries are paramilitary law enforcement units that retain a mix of
military and police functions. Notable examples include the Italian Carabinieri,the
Turkish Jandarma, and the French Gendarmerie Nationale. While these states
organize these forces differently, the melding of traditional police work with the
attributes and duties of military forces is the common thread.
77.
See ILA, supra note 52, at 33 (discussing the chances of human rights
violations when states assert belligerent powers outside the context of an armed
conflict).
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if not paralysis-generated by this approach. In these situations, it
should come as no surprise that a government determined to
extinguish a nascent opposition would seek to exploit this regulatory
uncertainty to maximum advantage. Nothing could be more
inconsistent with the original motivation for Common Article 3.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

RECOGNITION

As noted above, there is no dispute that Common Article 3 was
included in the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the specific purpose of
mitigating the humanitarian suffering associated with brutal internal
armed struggles. Indeed, the original proposal by the ICRC went
much further, suggesting that no distinction should be made between
types of armed conflicts, for the simple reason that human suffering
was simply not contingent on whether an armed conflict was
international or internal.7 8 Although ultimately rejected by the states
party to the treaties, this original proposal remains a powerful
reminder of the underlying goal of the compromise that evolved into
Common Article 3: to prevent the type of humanitarian suffering
international law had been incapable of addressing prior to 1949.
Naturally, a key question associated with the new article was
determining exactly when internal disturbances crossed the
triggering threshold from a domestic criminal law problem to an
international humanitarian law problem, precisely because states
remain reluctant to countenance international intrusions into what
they view as domestic matters.79 Although Common Article 3's black
letter text does not provide further clarification as to when a given
situation constitutes an armed conflict so as to trigger LOAC, its
objective was abundantly clear: to implement the post-World War II
focus on the need to extend LOAC applicability to internal conflicts. 8 0

78.
The ICRC Commentary explains that the ICRC originally submitted a draft
of Article 2 including the following paragraph:
In all cases of armed conflict which are not of an international character,
especially in cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may
occur in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, the
implementing of the principles of the present Convention shall be obligatory on
each of the adversaries. The application of the Convention in these
circumstances shall in no wise [sic] depend on the legal status of the Parties to
the conflict and shall have no effect on that status.
3 ICRC, supra note 7, at 31.
79.
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 35-36 ("What is meant by 'armed conflict not
of an international character'? That was the burning question . . . .").
80.
Michael W. Lewis, InternationalMyopia: Hamdan's Shortcut to "Victory,"

42 U. RIcH. L. REV. 687, 698-99 (2008).
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Common Article 3's text emphasizes the provision's goal of
ensuring minimum humanitarian protections in all situations of
armed conflict, but offers little guidance with regard to what
constitutes an armed conflict.8 1 The applicability threshold was,
however, a major focus of the associated Commentary. According to
the Commentary, it was both impossible and ill-advised to attempt to
identify a specific test for determining the applicability of Common
Article 3; rather, the Commentary proposed what is best understood
as a totality of the circumstances analysis intended to effectuate the
underlying humanitarian objectives of the new article: to interpret
Common Article 3 as broadly as possible. 82
The Commentary offers critical insight into the intent of the
drafters in the form of indicative-but not dispositive-factors or
characteristics of a Common Article 3 conflict, based on the nature
and behavior of both state and nonstate parties. For example, the
response of the state is a critical component,8 3 in particular whether
it employs its regular armed forces in combating the nonstate actor
and whether it has recognized the nonstate actor as a belligerent.8 4
As noted above, ignoring the nature of the government's response in
pursuit of conflict recognition is a serious shortcoming and fails to
take into account the practicalities of the situation. In addition,
several considerations can provide useful guidance for understanding
whether violence or hostilities have progressed beyond internal
disturbances, such as whether the nonstate actor (1) has an organized
military force; (2) has an authority responsible for its acts; (3) acts
within a determinate territory, having the means of ensuring respect
for the Geneva Conventions; and (4) acts as a de facto governing
entity, and its armed forces are prepared to obey the laws of war.85

81.
The first sentence of Common Article 3 simply states: "In the case of armed
conflict not *of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions. . . ." GC III, supra note 10.
82.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 36 ("Does this mean Article 3 is not applicable in
cases where armed strife breaks out in a country, but does not fulfill any of [the
suggested criteria]? We do not subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that
the Article should be applied as widely as possible.").
83.
Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON
TERROR AND THE LAWs OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1, 17 (Michael Lewis et al.
eds., 2009); see also Abella v. Argentina, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 55/97,
1 155 (Nov. 18, 1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/
97eng/Argentinalll37.htm (noting that one consideration in finding the existence of
an armed conflict was that the President "ordered that military action be taken to
recapture the base and subdue the attackers").
84.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 35-36.
85.
Id. None of these factors is dispositive; rather, these and other factors may
be used to distinguish acts of banditry, short-lived insurrection, or terrorist acts from
armed conflict. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukid, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment,
T 879-888 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009) (applying
different and overlapping factors to determine whether an armed conflict existed);
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
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These factors or considerations are just that: factors and
considerations. The Commentary explains that the idea of defining
the term conflict was abandoned after some debate, as was the
inclusion of a list of "a certain number of conditions on which the
application of the Convention would depend." 86 Rather, as explained
above, the drafters intended Common Article 3 to have as broad a
scope as possible.87 Nor can it be ignored that the drafters of both
Common Article 3 and the Commentary were, by necessity, basing
their catalogue of factors on their collective experiences, indicating
that as the nature of conflict evolves, so must the relevance of other
potential conflict identification indicators.
In 1992, the importance of Common Article 3's objective-to
mitigate the brutality of internal wars and mandate a minimum level
of humane treatment-was elevated to unprecedented international
attention when the break-up of the former Yugoslavia rapidly
devolved into widespread armed violence. A new front in the
regulation of intrastate hostilities emerged: the extension of
international criminal responsibility for violations of the laws and
customs of war to situations of internal armed conflict.8 8 This
important development necessitated, however, identification of the
armed conflict demarcation point not as a matter of policy or theory,
but as a jurisdictional predicate to the imposition of this criminal
responsibility.8 9 The conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the
international decision to impose criminal responsibility on the
participants of that conflict, generated the first, and by any measure,
seminal, international judicial opinion analyzing the existence of an
internal armed conflict: Prosecutor v. Tadi6.90 The methodology
utilized by the ICTY to assess the situation in Bosnia evolved into
what is often characterized as the elements test, an approach to
conflict analysis that is potentially undermining the objectives that
originally motivated the adoption of Common Article 3.
A. Tadid and Its Framework
In Tadi, the first case heard by the ICTY, the Tribunal
immediately faced the question of whether the situation in the former

Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,
84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Tadk,
Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision of Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Vith, supra
note 42, at 76-77.
86.
4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 35.
Id. at 36.
87.
88.
Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, J 94-128.
89.
Id. 66.
90.
Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction.
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Yugoslavia was an armed conflict.9 1 In particular, charges brought
under Article 2 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and
Article 3 (violations of the laws and customs of war) of the Statute of
the ICTY applied only to situations of armed conflict,92 rendering this
determination a jurisdictional predicate to any criminal responsibility
for the alleged violation of these provisions. In a decision on
interlocutory appeal, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY set forth the
modern definition of armed conflict: "[A]n armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."9 3 In
the context of examining the broader purposes and goals of Common
Article 3 and understanding its application, it is important to note
that the Appeals Chamber emphasized that the notion of armed
conflict has a broad geographical and temporal scope. 94 This broad
scope is directly related to the protective purposes of the Geneva
Conventions; the ICTY specified that "the rules contained in Article 3
also apply outside the narrow geographical context of the actual
theatre of combat operations" and that "the temporal scope of the
applicable rules clearly reaches beyond the actual hostilities."9 5 As
such, the ICTY looked to the object and purpose of the LOAC as a
guide in understanding the reach and parameters of the law's
application.9 6 This definition has not only been the driving factor in
the ICTY's jurisprudence, but was also adopted by the drafters of the
Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)97

91.
Id. See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND
THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG (1997).

92.
Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Updated Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 2 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.icty.org/sid/135 ("The International Tribunal shall have the power to
prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention. . . ."); id.
art. 3 ("The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating
the laws or customs of war.").
93.
Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70.
68 69.
Id.
94.
95.
Id. 69.
96.
Id. TT 67-69; see also Laurie R. Blank & Amos N. Guiora, Teaching an Old
Dog New Tricks: Operationalizingthe Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV.
NAT'L SECURITY J. 45, 52-53 (2010) ("When unforeseen situations have demanded new
answers, LOAC's basic principles have guided interpretations and helped find solutions
to preserve and protect the law's core values.").
97.
Rome Statute, supra note 61, art. 8(2)(f) (defining non-international armed
conflicts as conflicts "that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups").
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and by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 8 It
continues to be the most common and oft-cited contemporary
definition of armed conflict.99
In its decision on the merits, the Tadit Trial Chamber took this
definition and the Commentary's broad-stroke guidelines and
expounded on the meaning and parameters of non-international
armed conflict under Common Article 3. Fleshing out the definition,
the ICTY thus laid the foundation for what was to become the twoprong elements test-the ultimate legacy of Tadi.o100 According to the
Tribunal:
The test applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence of an
armed conflict for the purposes of the rules contained in Common
Article 3 focuses on two aspects of a conflict; the intensity of the conflict
and the organization of the parties to the conflict. In an armed conflict
of an internal or mixed character, these closely related criteria are used
solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed
conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or
terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian
10 1
law.

Importantly, the Trial Chamber further noted that factors relevant to
identifying the threshold between armed conflict and lower level
types of violence-e.g., riots, terrorist activities, etc.-are discussed in
the Commentary.1 0 2 In a brief analysis, the Trial Chamber then
concluded that given the ongoing hostilities and the nature of the
parties to the conflict in Bosnia
at all relevant times, an armed conflict was taking place between the
parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of
sufficient scope and intensity for the purposes of the application of the
law or customs of war embodied in Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions. 10 3

The Tadi6 definition quickly became the determinative
statement on what constitutes armed conflict. Subsequent cases at
the ICTY and the ICTR relied on the definition of armed conflict as
protracted violence between the government and organized armed
groups or between two or more armed groups as the paradigm for
identifying the existence of an armed conflict. 104 In most of these

98.
See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
619-620
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 2, 1998) (citing the Tadi6 criteria for
determining the existence of an armed conflict).
99.
See ILA, supra note 52, at 3 (noting that the Tadi6 decision is "widely cited
for its description of the characteristics of armed conflict").
100.
Id.
101.
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 1 562 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
102.
Id.
103.
Id. 568.
104.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Marti, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, 41 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007) (quoting the Tadi6 definition of
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cases, the Tribunal examined the nature of the fighting and the
relevant parties in some fashion in order to determine if the facts of
the situation objectively fit within the definition as set forth in Tadi6.
However, the Tadie definition and the reference to intensity and
organization as useful considerations were not applied as a test of
factors. Rather, the tribunals noted the relevance of intensity and
organization and used the two considerations as guides to
understanding the evidence presented regarding the situation at
hand. Thus, even in many of the cases routinely cited for the
proposition that Tadid established a two-part test of factors, the
terms intensity and organization do not appear as identifiable factors,
or-in some cases-even at all.
In Prosecutor v. Delali and Prosecutor v. Kordie, for example,
decided in the first few years after Tadie, neither the Trial Chamber
nor the Appeals Chamber set forth intensity and organization as
distinct factors that were required to be independently satisfied in
assessing the existence of a conflict. 0 5 Even later, nearly ten years
after Tadi6, the ICTY continued to explore the existence of armed
conflict as a predicate for the imposition of criminal responsibility
using the foundational Tadid definition without the further step of a
test of elements or factors. Prosecutor v. Halilovi6, decided in 2005,
does not mention the words intensity or organization; the Tribunal
assessed the nature of the hostilities and military operations and
concluded that an armed conflict existed at the relevant time.106 One
year later, the ICTY took a similar approach in Prosecutor v.
Haddihasanovid, looking at the escalation and continuation of the
hostilities and the efforts to broker a deal between the two different
sides to the conflict, again without reference to specific factors of
intensity and organization. 0 7 Finally, in Prosecutor v. Marti6,
decided in 2007, the Trial Chamber again provided the definition of
armed conflict without any further breakdown into specific factors or
elements to be satisfied. 0 8 The ICTR generally followed the same
approach, helping to establish the Tadi6 definition of armed conflict

armed conflict); Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, T 160-173
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005) (considering the facts and
determining that an armed conflict existed in the territories of Bosnia and
Herzegovina); Prosecutor v. Kordid, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 1 24 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) (applying the Tadid definition of armed
conflict); Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, T 327 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998) (applying the "control test" from Tadi6);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 1 603 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting
that existence of an armed conflict is determined by objective criteria).
105.
Kordi, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, TT 24, 333-341; Delalid, Case
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, TT 182-191.
106.
Halilovi, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment,
160-173.
107.
Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovi6, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, TT 20-25
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006).
108.
Marti6, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, 41.

VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

720

LAW

[VOL. 46:693

as the definitive modern definition for use not only by the ICTY, but
also by a variety of national and international courts and tribunals
around the world.' 0 9 It is, however, important to note that the
conflicts in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda overwhelmingly
satisfied both elements of intensity and organization, rendering
assessment of the relationship between these two factors unnecessary
for either tribunal as each analyzed the existence of non-international
armed conflict.
B. The Strict Elements Test Takes Hold
Over time, however, Tadi6 morphed into a formal test of
elements. Challenges to the ICTY's jurisdiction over events in Kosovo
appear to have been the primary catalyst for this evolution in how
0
Tadid is understood. Starting with Prosecutor v. Milogevi6,1 the

ICTY began to alter its presentation of the Tadi6 definition of armed
conflict and how it should be applied. Rather than setting forth the
definition, looking at the evidence proffered regarding the situation at
issue, and reaching a determination as to the existence of a conflict
based on an overall understanding of who was fighting, how they
were fighting, where they were fighting, for how long, and so on, the
Tribunal began to state the definition and then immediately list two
factors: intensity and organization."' Analysis then proceeded solely
within the construct of this two-part test, with little or no regard for
any of the other considerations discussed in the Commentary or
elsewhere, such as the nature of the government response or the
involvement of the international community.112
A trio of cases cemented the two factors as a strict elements test
for determining the existence of an armed conflict-Prosecutor v.
Limaj, Prosecutorv. Haradinaj,and Prosecutor v. Bolkoski-the first
two addressing events in Kosovo and the latter events in
Macedonia. 113 Limaj, decided in 2005, provided a new and extensive

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-95-1C, Judgment, 92
109.
(March 14, 2005); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 620.
See Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Motion for
110.
Judgment of Acquittal,
14-32 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16,
2004).
111.

For the purposes of this Motion, the relevant portion of the Tadid test,
which has been consistently applied within the Tribunal, is "protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups". This calls for an examination of (1) the organisation of
the parties to the conflict and (2) the intensity of the conflict.

Id. 1 17.
112.
Id. 11 17-22.
Prosecutor v. Boikoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 175 (Int'l Crim.
113.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT04-84-T, Judgment, T 37-38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3,
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analysis of intensity and organization as the apparently exclusive
determinative factors in applying the Tadie definition of armed
conflict to the facts at hand. The Limaj judgment devotes forty-two
paragraphs to the analysis of the requisite organization of the parties
and thirty-four paragraphs to the analysis of the intensity of the
fighting. 114 In so doing, the judgment laid the foundation for a
comprehensive elements test-one that would itself ultimately
include lists of subfactors and components. 115 Three years later, the
ICTY left no doubt as to its reliance on this strict elements test. In
Haradinaj, the Trial Chamber first devoted extensive attention to
formulating the test based on past precedent and then, like Limaj,
engaged in extensive analysis of the facts regarding the fighting
solely within the framework of intensity and organization.116
Boikoski involved alleged crimes committed in the northern part
of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia in 2001.117 Events in
Macedonia had not yet come before the ICTY and the charges
therefore mandated a fresh examination of whether an armed conflict
existed at the time, so as to attach international criminal
responsibility for violations of the laws and customs of war. As in the
previous two cases, the Trial Chamber began with the Tadid
definition and expressly stated that the definition had to be applied
by examining intensity and organization, to the exclusion of other
considerations discussed in the Commentary."
The judgment
explains:
The Trial Chamber in Tadid noted that factors relevant to this
determination are addressed in the Commentary to Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions. These "convenient criteria" were identified
by the drafters of Common Article 3 during negotiations of the Geneva
Conventions in order to distinguish an armed conflict from lesser forms
of violence, although these were rejected from the final text. While
these criteria give some useful indications of armed conflict, they
remain examples only. The drafters of the Commentary were of the
view that Common Article 3 should be applied as widely as possible and
could still be applicable in cases where "armed strife breaks out in a
country, but does not fulfil any of the above conditions". The Trial
Chamber in Limaj, after having reviewed the drafting history of
Common Article 3, concluded that "no such explicit requirements for
the application of Common Article 3 were intended by the drafters of
the Geneva Conventions". Consistent with this approach, Trial

2008); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).
114.
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment,
92-169. Regarding the
definition or understanding of the term organized armed group, see Peter Margulies,
Networks in Noninternational Armed Conflicts: Crossing Borders and Defining
"OrganizedArmed Group," 89 INT'L L. STUD. 54 (2012).
115.
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (detailing numerous factors and
considerations in the assessment of intensity and organization).
116.
Haradinaj,Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, TT 39-99.
117.
Bokkoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 1.
118.
Id. T 175.
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Chambers have assessed the existence of armed conflict by reference to
objective indicative factors of intensity of the fighting and the
organisation of the armed group or groups involved depending on the
facts of each case. 1 1 9

In effect, the interpretation of the Tadid definition of armed conflict
had thus fully morphed into a test of two exclusive and independent
factors: intensity and organization.
Throughout the same process, the understanding of intensity
and organization themselves as useful indicators of the existence of
armed conflict also changed and transformed into an elements test. In
a variety of cases, the ICTY has highlighted key factual information
that helps to demonstrate the intensity of fighting, such as the
number, duration, and intensity of individual confrontations; the
types of weapons and other military equipment used; the number of
persons and types of forces engaged in the fighting; the geographic
and temporal distribution of clashes; the territory that has been
captured and held; the number of casualties; the extent of material
destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. 120
Frequency of confrontations and the involvement of the UN Security
Council also prove to be indicative of intensity for the purposes of
identifying an armed conflict. 121 Similarly, with regard to
organization, cases have focused on a range of information about the
groups involved in the conflict, such as a hierarchical structure;
territorial control and administration; the ability to recruit and train
combatants; the ability to launch operations using military tactics;
the ability to enter peace or cease-fire agreements; the ability to issue
internal regulations; and the ability to coordinate multiple units. 122
There is little doubt that all of these various considerations are
useful means for assessing the intensity of fighting and the
organizational framework of parties to a conflict. However, the
regular application of the Tadid definition through an elements test
has further influenced the presentation and analysis of intensity and
organization into factor tests of their own, only serving to solidify the
formalized nature of the inquiry. A look at how the examination of
organization as a key element of the armed conflict test has changed
offers a useful example of the overall dynamic. Early cases focused on

119.
Id. 1 176 (footnotes omitted).
120.
Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 1 49; Limaj, Case No. IT-0366-T, Judgment,
135-143; Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment,
11 564-565 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
121.
See Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, 1 49; Vit6, supra note 42,
at 76-77 (discussing a range of indicators of armed conflict beyond those referenced in
the text above, including the government's response and the collective nature of the
fighting); see also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, 11 3440 (Mar. 14, 2012).
122.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lukik, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgment, 1 884 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T,
Judgment, 1 60; Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 1$ 95-109.
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whether the hostilities involved at least two sides fighting against
each other, without too much further detail.123 The ICTY has
regularly referred to "some degree of organization" 124 when broadly
characterizing this pillar of its armed conflict analysis. Indeed, this
phrasing coincides with the ICRC's characterization of "a minimum
amount of organisation"125 as a feature of non-international armed
conflicts. Seeking evidence of some organization is obviously logical,
as the law itself is framed in terms of "parties" to an armed conflict.
Over time, however, organization began to be understood as a
strictly independent requirement, analyzed as a series of factors, such
as the five categories of factors set forth in Bolkoski: factors signaling
the presence of a command structure, factors indicating the ability to
carry out military operations in an organized manner, factors
indicating a level of logistics, factors relevant to whether the group
has sufficient discipline to implement the LOAC, and factors
demonstrating that the group can speak with "one voice."126 As a
result, the focus of the organization inquiry shifted from identifying
some modicum of organization to satisfy the "party" element of armed
conflict, enabling consideration of how this element interrelates with
the intensity of operations, to an independent requirement.' 2 7 Several
cases have also detailed components of an intensity analysis as well,
listing many of the considerations identified in the previous
paragraph. 2 8 Notwithstanding the relevance of any one or more of
the various subfactors the cases have identified, the effect of a factor-

123.
See supra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
124.
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, . 89 (referring to a 1999 ICRC
Working Paper submitted to the Preparatory Commission for the establishment of the
elements of crimes for the International Criminal Court, which stated that armed
conflict involves hostilities between armed forces that are organized to a greater or
lesser extent).
125.
ICRC, How Is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International
Humanitarian Law? 5 (ICRC Opinion Paper, 2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
126.
Prosecutor v. Bolkoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment,
199-203 (July
10, 2008).
127.
Id.
206 (referring specifically to an independent "criterion of
organization").
128.
Prosecutor v. Mrkgi6, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, 407 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007); see also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case
No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008);
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment. The Tribunal in Mrkii indicated:
Relevant for establishing the intensity of a conflict are, inter alia, the
seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed clashes, their spread
over territory and over a period of time, the increase in the number of
government forces, the mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among
both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the
attention of the United Nations Security Council, and if so whether any
resolutions on the matter have been passed.
Mrkiei, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, T 407 (footnotes omitted)
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based analysis for intensity and organization has only served to
solidify the idea of a strict elements test for the definition of armed
conflict.
The application of this strict elements test has taken hold beyond
the ICTY's jurisprudence and has seemingly become the authoritative
standard for assessing conflict recognition in situations of internal
violence.129 In May 2005, motivated by the United States' assertion of
a "global war on terror" in response to the attacks of September 11,
2001, the Executive Committee of the International Law Association
(ILA) approved a mandate for the Use of Force Committee to produce
a report on the meaning of war or armed conflict in international
law.' 3 0 In effect, the United States consistently claimed the right to
exercise belligerent privileges applicable only during armed conflict
anywhere in the world where members of terrorist groups are
found.13 1 This position ran directly contrary to a trend of states
generally attempting to avoid acknowledging involvement in wars or
armed conflicts.1 32 The ILA report relied substantially on the Tadid
definition of armed conflict and "confirmed that at least two
characteristics are found with respect to all armed conflict: 1.) The
existence of organized armed groups; 2.) Engaged in fighting of some
intensity."' 3 3 The report continued:
The Committee, however, found little evidence to support the view that
the Conventions apply in the absence of fighting of some intensity. For
non-state actors to move from chaotic violence to being able to challenge
the armed forces of a state requires organization, meaning a command
structure, training, recruiting ability, communications, and logistical
capacity. Such organized forces are only recognized as engaged in

129.
See, e.g., Vit6, supra note 42, at 76-77 ("When one or other of these two
conditions [intensity or organization] is not met, a situation of violence may well be
defined as internal disturbances or internal tensions.").
130.
ILA, supra note 52, at 1.
131.
See, e.g., George W. Bush, President, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html ("Our war on terror
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."); Kenneth Roth, The Law
of War in the War on Terror: Washington's Abuse of "Enemy Combatants," 83 FOREIGN
AFF. 2, 2 (2004), (quoting President George W. Bush stating that "[o]ur war on terror
will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past[-it] will be
fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan").
See Edith Lederer, Newsday, U.N. Seeks To Stop Use of Child Soldiers,
132.
NONVIOLENT

RADIcAL

PARTY

TRANSNAT'L

&

TRANSPARTY,

Apr.

23,

2004,

http://www.radicalparty.org/en/content/un-seeks-stop-use-child.soldiers (It.) (describing
how Russia and Britain held up a Security Council Resolution condemning the use of
child soldiers in armed conflicts until both Chechnya and Northern Ireland were
removed from the list of armed conflicts).
133.
ILA, supra note 52, at 1-2.

2013/

LOSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES

725

armed conflict when fighting between them is more than a minimal
134
engagement or incident.

In reaching this conclusion, the report effectively wraps the past few
decades of conflict recognition and analysis in the cloak of intensity
and organization, placing a solid veneer on the strict elements test
formulated by the ICTY over the past several years.

C. Conflict Recognition in Syria
On March 15, 2011, Syrian activists called for a national day of
rage in the aftermath of popular uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and
Tunisia. 35 Syrian troops opened fire on the demonstrations in Dera'a,
killing five people and accelerating the pace of the discontent in Syria
that had simmered since December 2010.136 Between March and
37
June 2011, demonstrations continued to spread throughout Syria.1
The Assad regime used military force in a manner that can in no way
be reconciled with a constabulary mission.1 38 Instead, the nature of
the force employed was a patent example of a state unleashing
combat power to quell an internal insurrection-most notably the
deployment of Syrian infantry and mechanized units.' 3 9 On July 29,
2011, a group of deserted Syrian officers released a video announcing
the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).140 At the same time,
disparate groups of Syrians began resisting the regime with armed
violence on a local level.14 1 After the formation of the FSA, some of

Id. at 2.
134.
135.
Associated Press, A Timeline of Some Key Events in Syrian Uprising,
CNSNEWS.COM, Mar. 15, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/timeline-some-key-eventssyrian-uprising; Protesters Stage Rare Demo in Syria, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 15, 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/20113151834383782.html (Qatar).
136.
See Katherine Marsh, Syria: Four Killed in Deraa as Protests Spread
Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
Across South, GUARDIAN,
2011/mar/22/syrian-protests-troops-kill-deraa (U.K.).
Liam Stack, Syrian Tanks Move in on City as Thousands Mourn Protesters'
137.
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/world/
middleeast/05syria.html?_r=1&; Syria Unrest: Deadly Fresh Protests Erupt, BBC, June
17, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 13812882 (U.K.).
See Borzu Daragahi, Syrian Troops Fire on Protesters, 34 Killed, L.A.
138.
TIMES, May 20, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/20/world/la-fg-syriaprotests-kurds-20110521; Roula Hajjar, SYRIA: Assad's Security Forces Increasingly
Violent [Video], L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2011, 8:17 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
babylonbeyond/2011/08/syria-protesters.html.
See Anthony Shadid, Syrian Military Mounts Assault on Another City, N.Y.
139.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/world/middleeast/
7,
2011,
Aug.
TIMES,
08syria.html?pagewanted=all.
140.
Asharq Al-Awsat, Syrian Army Colonel Defects Forms Free Syrian Army,
ASHARQ AL-AWSAT (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=
1&id=26095.
Saad Abedine, Military Defectors Unite Under Free Syrian Army, CNN,
141.
Mar. 25, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/24/world/meast/syria-unrest; Justin Vela,
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the local groups professed allegiance to the FSA, while others did
not. 142 Those resisting the regime armed themselves with automatic
weapons and rocket propelled grenades, as well as improvised
explosive devices.143
Over the course of the fall and winter, the struggle between the
regime and the opposition became increasingly militarized, with
extensive combat in cities throughout the country and steady reports
of large-scale military attacks on towns and residential areas,
atrocities, and escalating violence.144 By spring, heavy fighting
continued and the Syrian rebels continued to gain in numbers, helped
by defections from the Syrian Army and the regime.14 5 Throughout
this time, the wholly unrestrained nature of the fighting continued,
with government forces reportedly attacking towns and cities
indiscriminately with tanks, mortars, helicopter gunships, and other
heavy weaponry.146

In September 2011, the UN Human Rights Council
an Independent International Commission of Inquiry to
alleged violations of human rights from March 2011
Syria.14 7 Within the next eight months, the Commission

established
investigate
onward in
issued two

On the Front Line with Syria's Free Army, FOREIGN POL'Y, Dec. 8, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/08/syriajfree..armyjrebels.
142.
See Abedine, supra note 141 (describing challenges to unification of
resistance groups).
143.
See, e.g., Inside Syria: The Rebel Call for Arms and Ammunition, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 11, 2011, 10:11 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/11/inside-syriarebels-call-arms (U.K.).
144.
See, e.g., Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syrian Demonstrators Call for
International Protection, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2011, 6:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/09/09/us-syria-idUSTRE7883AP20110909 (reporting that Syrian forces
killed six pro-democracy activists); 'Many Dead' in Latest Syria Clashes, AL JAZEERA
(Oct. 14, 2011, 12:18 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/10/
20111013232820923909.html (Qatar) (reporting that Assad's troops stormed the town
of Banash and launched an attack on the village of Taum, killing twenty people,
including ten civilians); Syrian Troops Wipe Out Village,' IRISH EXAMINER (Dec. 21,
2011, 6:02 PM), http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/world/syrian-troops-wipeout-village-533148.html (Ir.) (reporting that Syrian troops attacked the village of Kfar
Owaid with rockets, machine guns, and tanks, killing approximately one hundred
people).
145.
Kelly McEvers, Defectors Offer Insider's View of Syrian Army, NPR (Apr. 9,
2012, 3:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/09/150257045/defected-soldiers-offerinsiders-view-of-syrian-army.
146.
Julian Borger & Mona Mahmood, Syrian Troops Bombard Sealed off
Suburb of Homs, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 9,
2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2012/febl09/syrian-troops-suburb-homs (U.K.) (reporting that one hundred
civilians were killed after Syrian tanks, gunships, and artillery bombarded Homs);
Syrian Army Moves To Wrest Damascus Suburbs from Rebels, BBC, Jan. 29, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16779203
(U.K.) (reporting that the
Syrian army used tanks and mortar shells against suburban Damascus).
147.
Human Rights Council Res. S-17/2, 1 12, 17th Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/S-17/2 (Nov. 23, 2011). There have been extensive critiques of the Human
Rights Council's application of international humanitarian law, challenging the
mandate of the Council to apply this body of law. See, e.g., Daphn6 Richemond-Barak,
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reports and at least one periodic update, in November 2011, February
2012, and May 2012, respectively. 148 As fighting raged between
government forces and the opposition-leaving civilians trapped in an
increasingly dangerous and deadly zone of combat throughout the
country-the Commission's reports offer a telling, and troubling,
example of reliance on the formalized elements test for identifying an
armed conflict in accordance with the definition the ICTY originally
set forth in Tadi6.
The first report, issued in November 2011, described widespread
combat operations by regular state armed forces and an increasingly
violent response to the protests. 149 More than 3,500 civilians had
been killed and some defectors and regime opponents had organized
themselves into the FSA.o50 By November, the report stated,
"military and security forces carried out operations in Homs, Dar'a,
Hama, Dayr Az Zawr and Rif Damascus," including in residential
areas; in Homs, "[a]ccording to eyewitnesses, tanks deployed in and
around the city frequently fired at residential buildings." 1
Estimates were that 260 civilians were killed in the last week of
October and the first two weeks of November.' 5 2 "According to
information received, a small number of defectors claiming to be part
of the Free Syrian Army engaged in operations against State forces,
killing and injuring members of military and security forces."15 3 In
assessing the applicable law that would guide its analysis of alleged
crimes in Syria, the Commission expressed its concern that the
events in Syria risked rising to the level of an internal armed conflict,
which would, of course, trigger application of the LOAC.1 54 The
Commission stated that the test for an internal armed conflict

The Human Rights Council and the Convergence of Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights Law, in SHAPING A GLOBAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE (William Banks ed., 2012) (arguing that the
Human Rights Council has neither the mandate nor the expertise to address
international humanitarian law issues). In particular, the Council's examination and
application of international humanitarian law-or LOAC, as used in this Articlehighlights the dissonance often encountered between the operational implementation
of the law at the time of the conflict and the post hoc examination and application of
the law for accountability purposes.
148.
Rep. of the Indep. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
19th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Syria Report];
Rep. of the Indep. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 17th Spec.
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Syria Report];
Periodic Update from the Indep. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
(May 24, 2012) [hereinafter Syria Periodic Update].
149.
2011 Syria Report, supra note 148,
27-83.
Id. ] 28-29.
150.
151.
Id. 39.
152.
Id.
153.

Id.

154.

Id. T 97.

728

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 46:693

consisted of the two criteria of intensity and organization and then
concluded:
The commission was unable to verify the level of the intensity of
combat between Syrian armed forces and other armed groups.
Similarly, it has been unable to confirm the level of organization of such
armed groups as the Free Syrian Army. For the purposes of the present
report, therefore, the commission will not apply international
humanitarian law to the events in the Syrian Arab Republic since
March 2011.155

Although the situation in the fall of 2011 in Syria was certainly not
clear-cut one way or the other, a comparison of some of the factual
descriptions in the report with similar brief descriptions in early
cases before the ICTY shows the extent to which intensity and
organization have become a strict test of elements.15 6
Three months later, the Commission issued a second report,
focused on the period between November 2011 and February 2012.157
The report noted that "the crisis ha[d] become increasingly violent
and militarized" and that the "rise of an armed opposition led the
Government to intensify its violent repression." 58 Describing the
violence, the Commission stated that FSA groups had launched
offensive operations against police stations, government forces, and
checkpoints.' 59 Government forces continued to shell residential
areas with heavy weapons. 60 The Commission also referenced
numbers of casualties among civilians, armed forces, and police
officers. 161 Finally, with regard to the opposition forces, the report
explained that many "anti-Government armed groups identify
themselves as FSA and consist of defectors (mainly from the army)
and an increasing number of armed civilians," and the leadership's
control (from abroad) over the different FSA groups inside the
country remained unclear.16 2 At this time, one year after the start of
the violence and at a time when armed opposition groups and the
government fought throughout the country for control of areas from
Homs to 'Idlib to Damascus, the Commission continued to adhere
rigidly to a formalistic and strict application of a two-factor test for
the existence of an armed conflict: "While the commission is gravely
concerned that the violence in certain areas may have reached the
requisite level of intensity, it was unable to verify that the Free
Syrian Army (FSA), local groups identifying themselves as such or

155.
Id. 99.
156.
See the discussion of earlier references to the Tadi6 definition in supra
notes 110-128 and accompanying text.
157.
2012 Syria Report, supra note 148.
Id. 17.
158.
159.
Id. 19.
Id. 20.
160.
161.
Id.
22-25.
162.
Id. 18.

2013/

LOSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES

729

other anti-Government armed groups had reached the necessary level
of organization."1 63 The juxtaposition of the events in Syria at the
time and the Commission's methodology dramatically demonstrates
the effect of the strict elements test. Thousands of civilians and
hundreds of soldiers had been killed. 164 The FSA and other groups
were engaging in military operations in towns across the country and
were able to force government groups out of and even consolidate
control in selected areas. Most of all, the government was using
nearly the full extent of its military capabilities-including attacks
from the air-against the opposition forces and the civilian
population, creating a situation of unrestrained brutality and combat
with no regulation and no respite.
Finally, in May 2012, the Commission issued a Periodic Update
on events since March 2012.165 The Commission stated that it "has
taken note of the intensity of the violence in the Syrian Arab Republic
as well as the increasingly organized nature of armed groups in some
areas." 166 It nonetheless described the situation as one in which
"gross violations continue unabated in an increasingly militarized
context."167 At the same time, the international community remained
reluctant to use the term armed conflict to describe events in Syria.
As late as May 2012, the ICRC refrained from characterizing events
across the country as an internal armed conflict, noting instead only
that the fighting in Homs and Idlib likely rose to the level of an
internal armed conflict.168 In mid-July, the ICRC announced that it

13. The Commission explained further that it "uses the term 'FSA
163.
Id.
group' to refer to any local armed group whose members identify themselves as
belonging to the FSA, without this necessarily implying that the group has been
recognized by the FSA leadership or obeys the command of the FSA leadership
abroad." See also Syria Not in Civil War but Situation Grave: ICRC, REUTERS (Dec. 8,
2011, 5:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/08/us-syria-aid-idUSTRE7B727
C20111208 (reporting that the ICRC believed that the conflict in Syria did not qualify as
a civil war under international law at that time).
164.
Press Release, Security Council, Top UN Political Official Tells Security
Council Talks Started by Israelis, Palestinians in Amman Stalled, Time Not on Side of
"Either Party," U.N. Press Release SC/10560 (Feb. 28, 2012) (reporting that the UnderSecretary-General for Political Affairs informed the Security Council that the Syrian
death toll had reached 7,500 civilian casualties); Syria Unrest: Death Toll Passes 7500,
U.N. Says, BBC, Feb. 28, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17194593
(U.K.) (reporting that Assad claimed 1,345 members of the Syrian security forces had
also perished).
165.
Syria Periodic Update, supra note 148.
Id. 5.
166.
Id. 2.
167.
168.
See Update 2-Some Syria Violence Amounts to Civil War-Red Cross,
REUTERS (May 8, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/syriaredcross-idUSL5E8G87KJ20120508 (noting also that "[o]nly lately did they determine
that Syrian rebels represent an 'organized' opposition force").

730

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:693

viewed the situation in Syria as a non-international armed conflict,
thus triggering the application of the LOAC. 6 9
For over sixty years, the international community has recognized
and upheld the essential need to regulate internal armed conflicts.
Through treaty, customary law, and international and national
jurisprudence, the international community has steadily expanded
the law applicable to these conflicts, so that today there is
increasingly less distinction between the law of international armed
conflict and the law of internal armed conflict.' 70 More importantly,
the fundamental goals of the LOAC remain the same regardless of
the characterization of the conflict. As the ICTY stated in the very
same Tadi6 decision that set forth the modern definition of armed
conflict:
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or
the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private
property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering
when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from
enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed
71
violence has erupted "only" within the territory of a sovereign State?1

These questions resonate as strongly as ever in Syria. In response to
an internal challenge, the Assad regime-like so many other despotic
regimes facing similar challenges in the past-unleashed the full fury
of its combat power to cower the nascent antiregime movement. For
fifteen months, Syrian armed forces deliberately attacked civilians
and civilian property, targeted ambulances and journalists, and
prevented or restricted the delivery of humanitarian assistance, all
with absolutely no respect for the most fundamental tenets of conflict
regulation. By any measure, this was an unjustified, immoral, and
intolerable use of force. And yet sixty years of international law
designed to ensure that when a state resorts to military force to
protect internal interests, that force is subject to the same core
regulation as force applied in interstate hostilities, was rendered
prostrate by an overly technical conception of the conditions
triggering the law's application-as profound a distortion of the
origins of the law as could be imagined.

169.
Stephanie Nebehay, Exclusive: Red Cross Ruling Raises Questions of
Syrian War Crimes, REUTERS (July 15, 2012, 3:42 PM) http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/07/14/us-syria-crisis-icrc-idUSBRE86DO9H20120714.
170.
See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian
Law in Afghanistan, 85 INT'L L. STUD. SERIES U.S. NAVAL WAR C. 307, 308 (2009)
("[Tihe [LOAC] norms governing attacks during international armed conflicts, on one
hand, and non-international armed conflicts, on the other, have become nearly
indistinguishable.").
171.
Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 97 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
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The ultimate outcome of this distortion has been an unacceptable
dilution of the core purpose of the LOAC: to limit the brutality of
armed violence and protect civilians and belligerents from
unnecessary suffering and gratuitous violence. 7 2 While the
jurisprudential evolution of the broad and somewhat amorphous
definition of armed conflict must be acknowledged as a positive
development in the law, this is only the case if that development is
interpreted and understood to effectuate the object and purpose of the
law. The events in Syria demonstrate that what is needed is a more
pragmatic understanding of what has evolved into a strict elements
test, one that preserves the wisdom of focusing on these important
elements, but does so within a pragmatic framework sufficiently
responsive to the countless permutations of situations necessitating
applicability of the law. The process of conflict recognition must
therefore align more closely with the LOAC's goals in order to ensure
the most extensive fulfillment of those goals. How this reconciliation
may be achieved is illustrated by a source of law from a radically
different context, but one that reflects an almost identical process of
distortion of a core pragmatic purpose of the law and restoration of
that purpose through a more refined methodology of relying on
guiding elements to assess a critical legal question: U.S. probable
cause jurisprudence.

III. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: To BETTER SERVE THE LOAC's
OBJECT AND PURPOSE

Tadid is without question an invaluable contribution to the
conflict recognition and characterization landscape. However, as the
preceding discussion emphasizes, how the opinion has evolved into a
strict elements test actually undermines the original purpose of
Common Article 3 and the Commentary's proposed conflictassessment methodology. This concern arises not because these
elements are inappropriate to that recognition process; rather, it is
because they have become transformed into inflexible requirements,
distorting the totality approach. manifested in the Commentary.1 73 In
order to reconnect this recognition process to its origin, this strict
elements test must be reconceived, and the Tadi6 elements must
instead be understood as two guiding pillars in the totality of the
circumstances analysis. This approach will preserve the analytical
value of these elements, eliminate the unnecessary and unjustified
inflexibility that has evolved around them, and provide a much more
effective template for making a pragmatic assessment of the existence

172.
173.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.B.
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of an armed conflict, one that is not hobbled by a requirement to
completely satisfy both elements.

A. Analogy to U.S. ConstitutionalCriminal Jurisprudence
Conflict assessment, especially in the non-international context,
must be pragmatically driven. And a totality approach to this
assessment process better serves this goal than a strict elements test.
In support of this assertion, U.S. constitutional criminal law, and
specifically jurisprudence on the assessment of probable cause, offers
a remarkably useful analogy. Although probable cause analysis is
legally inapposite to armed conflict recognition analysis, similarities
in the objectives of both tests justifies consideration of the approach
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court as a model for assessing the
existence of non-international armed conflicts.
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
probable cause is the constitutional requirement to justify issuance of
a search warrant.174 Normally, assessing probable cause is relatively
uncomplicated, such as when it is based on a police officer's own
observation of criminal activity, or on scientific or eyewitness reports.
Loosely analogous to the traditional civil war in conflict recognition
analysis, these situations are so self-evident that resort to an
analytical methodology is basically unnecessary. However, the
challenge of assessing probable cause becomes far more complex and
difficult when the source of information is an informant's tip of
criminal activity. 7 5 In this situation, the only first-hand observation
of criminal activity comes from the informant, and while police
investigation in response to the tip may confirm noncriminal details
of the tip, the probable cause determination will ultimately reflect a
ratification of the tip, or "opinion" of ongoing criminal activity.1 7 6 How
the Supreme Court addressed the assessment of such tips, and more
importantly the value of utilizing a totality of the circumstances
approach to such assessments, provides a useful example of how a
similar approach would more effectively synchronize the Tadie
elements with the pragmatic purpose at the core of conflict
recognition.

174. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.3(a) (5th ed. 2009).
175.
See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (establishing that a
magistrate should know some of the underlying circumstances relied on by an
informant and some of the underlying circumstances that allowed an officer to conclude
that the informant was reliable); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969)
(establishing that the magistrate should also know the underlying circumstances and
context from which an informant had concluded a crime had been committed); Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (reversing the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test in
favor of a "totality of the circumstances" test).
176.
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 423 (White, J., concurring).
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In 1964, in the case of Aguilar v. Texas,177 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of when an informant's tip establishes probable
cause to support a warrant. The Court held that
the magistrate [the neutral officer making the probable cause
assessment] must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer [the officer requesting the warrant and presenting the
tip as the basis for the warrant] concluded that the informant, whose
identity need not be disclosed, was "credible" or his information
"reliable."1 7 8

Much like the Tadi6 decision, this holding evolved into a two-prong
test for assessing probable cause: first, the magistrate must assess
the underlying circumstances informing the tip (the foundation of
knowledge upon which the tip is based), and second, the magistrate
must be provided information to establish the informant's veracity.' 79
Although the Aguilar decision never addressed how each of these
prongs interrelates with the other, like the Tadid elements, these two
prongs evolved into strict individual requirements, with each prong
treated independently in the probable cause assessment.180
In 1969, the Supreme Court revisited this issue, and this time
endorsed this two-prong test when it decided United States v.
Spinelli.181 In Spinelli, the Court reviewed the propriety of a warrant
issued based on a confidential informant's tip. 8 2 The Court concluded
the tip was insufficient to establish probable cause because both
prongs of the Aguilar test were lacking.' 83 According to the Court, the
tip failed to satisfy both prongs because it offered no reason to
conclude that the informant was reliable (the veracity prong), nor did
it provide the type of predictive details indicating that the informant
obtained his information from Spinelli or from inside access to
Spinelli's alleged criminal activities (the basis of knowledge prong). 84
As a result, there was nothing on which a neutral reviewing official
could rely to conclude the tip was sufficiently reliable to establish
probable cause.18 5 Ostensibly because the evidence was insufficient to
meet the requirements of either prong of the standard, the

177.

Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.

178.
179.

Id.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 278-84.

180.
181.

See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 413.

182.

Id.

183.
Id. at 419.
184.
Id. at 417-18.
185.
See id. at 415-17 (explaining that reliance on an informant's tip, even when
police corroborate aspects of the tip's predictions that are readily observable by any
other person (and therefore not based on inside access to the alleged criminal activities
of the subject of the search), provides nothing upon which a neutral magistrate may
properly carry out his duty of determining the existence of probable cause).

734

VANDERBIL TOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:693

relationship of each of the prongs was once again omitted from the
decision.
Lower courts, however, began to fill this void. Based on these two
cases, lower courts developed what came to be known as the AguilarSpinelli two-prong test for establishing probable cause. 186 Pursuant
to this test, courts assumed that a finding of probable cause required
independent satisfaction of each of these prongs.18 7 Although the
Court never mandated the necessity of a strict compartmented
analysis, that method nonetheless evolved as the accepted meaning of
these decisions. Thus, while the deficiency of the informant's tip in
Spinelli implicated a total failure to provide adequate information on
either the informant's foundation of knowledge or credibility, these
were subsequently understood as independent requirements.' 88 Much
like the Tadi6 decision, the subsequent evolution of the AguilarSpinelli test potentially transformed it into a standard more
demanding than the Court ever intended to impose.' 89
Unlike Tadi6, however, this evolution itself became the object of
critique by the court that created the conditions leading to its
adoption: the Supreme Court. The strict two-prong test, requiring
independent satisfaction of each prong, itself came before the Court in
1984 in the case of Illinois v. Gates.o9 0 In Gates, a magistrate issued a
search warrant based on an anonymous tip, but a tip that included
significant indicia that the informant had intimate knowledge of the
suspect's criminal activities (growing and selling large amounts of
marijuana).' 9 ' Police investigated the tip and corroborated much of
the information provided by the informant, including future travel
activity of the suspect.192 Based on this information, a magistrate
issued a warrant to search the suspect's home. Police subsequently
discovered large amounts of marijuana in the suspect's home and
car.193
The suspect was convicted at trial, and when his appeal reached
the Illinois Supreme Court, the strict two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test
doomed the government's case. 194 Even though the police had
corroborated sufficient information to establish that the informant

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 n.5, 234 n.9 (1983) (describing the
186.
"entirely independent character" of both prongs and their rigid application by lower
courts).
Id. at 228.
187.
See id. (describing the Illinois Supreme Court's belief that the Aguilar188.
Spinelli test implemented a rigid test); id. at 229 (describing how the Illinois Supreme
Court used an "elaborate set of legal rules" in an effort to evaluate "veracity, reliability
and basis of knowledge" under Aguilar-Spinelli).
189.
Td. at 232 n.7.
Id. at 228.
190.
Id. at 225.
191.
Id. at 226.
192.
Id. at 227.
193.
Id. at 229.
194.
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had provided the tip of criminal activity with a solid foundation of
the
left
of
the
informant
anonymity
the
knowledge,
credibility/veracity prong of the two-prong test almost totally
vacant.195 As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court "reluctantly"
concluded that the magistrate erred in issuing the warrant. 196 This
crystallized the issue that had been brewing for two decades: was it
necessary to treat each of the two Aguilar-Spinelli prongs as
independent requirements? Or were they better understood as a
framework to guide a totality of the circumstances analysis of
probable cause?
The U.S. Supreme Court's answer was emphatic-because
probable cause is a practical, common sense assessment of all facts
and circumstances, the inflexibility of the strict two-prong approach
that had evolved from its earlier opinions actually undermined the
very purpose of probable cause assessment.' 9 7 Instead, these two
prongs are properly understood as a framework to guide a totality of
the circumstances assessment of probable cause, an assessment that
furthers the practical and pragmatic objective of determining a "fair
probability" of an alleged fact.19 8 According to the opinion:
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's
"veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant
in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that
these elements should be understood as entirely separate and
independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case, which the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as
detailed below, they should be understood simply as closely intertwined
issues that may usefully illuminate the common-sense, practical
question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband
199
or evidence is located in a particular place.

Central to the Court's opinion was the pragmatic nature of probable
cause, a standard that was never intended to connote a strict legal
test:
Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probablecause standard is that it is a "practical, nontechnical conception." "In
dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
200
not legal technicians, act."

As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual

195.
Id. at 227.
196.
Id. at 230.
197.
See id. at 234 (contrasting the more balanced totality of the circumstances
analysis with the stricter two-pronged Aguilar-Spinellitest).
198.
Id. at 238.
199.
Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
200.
Id. at 231 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.
The Court then explained why a totality of the circumstances
approach to assessing probable cause better served the underlying
objectives of this common sense assessment. 20 1 The Court's
articulation of this relationship is remarkably suited to the issue
presented in this Article: whether the objectives of armed conflict
assessment are furthered or undermined by viewing the Tadi6
elements as two distinct requirements.
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that
probable cause existed. We are convinced that this flexible, easily
applied standard will better achieve the accommodation of public and
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the
202
approach that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelli.

It is of course obvious that these cases had nothing to do with
international law or the identification of the armed conflict
demarcation point. However, the value in considering this evolution
of probable cause analysis is that, like the conflict recognition debate,
it turned on the validity of imposing a strict two-prong elements test
for this assessment. Furthermore, the pragmatic nature of the
probable cause determination laid the entire analytical foundation for
the Gates opinion. Both of these considerations are easily and
properly extended to the conflict recognition debate. As the Supreme
Court did with regard to probable cause, the Commentary indicates
almost without question that conflict recognition was intended to be a
pragmatic, practical, and common sense assessment. 203 Indeed, the
primary rationale for adopting the term armed conflict was the
inherent flaw in the overly legalistic assessment of "war." And like
probable cause analysis, a seminal international judicial decision
providing a logical and rational framework for determining the
existence of non-international armed conflict has evolved into a strict,
overly legal two-prong elements test. Modifying only a few words in
the preceding opinion extract highlights the logic of this analogy:
The task of conflict recognition is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances related to the
ongoing confrontation between the state and opposition groups,
including the "intensity of hostilities" and "organizationof opposition
forces", there is a fair probability that the situation has crossed the
thresholdfrom civil disturbance to armed hostilities. And the duty of a

201.
202.
203.

Id. at 232-35.
Id. at 238-39 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
See generally 3 ICRC, supra note 7, at 19-22, 34-37.
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assessing state or international organization is simply to ensure that
there is a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that an armed conflict
has commenced. We are convinced that this flexible, easily applied
standard will better achieve the accommodation of state and
humanitarian interests that international law requires than does the
204
approach that has developed from Tadie.

Adopting this totality of the circumstances methodology for
conflict recognition does not, as illustrated by the modified extract, in
any way diminish the importance of the Tadi6 factors. Instead, it
lodges those factors within a framework that is better suited for
making practical and common sense assessments than for technical
legal assessments. That pragmatic value enhances the significance of
these factors, which will continue to guide the analytical process.
Indeed, like the Gates approach, a totality of the circumstances
methodology in conjunction with the Tadi6 elements would result in
those elements serving as two essential guideposts for making the
pragmatic conflict recognition assessment. Why will this better serve
the objectives of the law? In Gates, the Court recognized that no
matter how solid the basis of knowledge was for an anonymous tip, a
strict two-prong approach would prohibit a finding of probable cause
because the anonymity of the informant would preclude any
assessment of veracity or reliability. 205 However, the Court also
recognized that, in practical terms, this did not make sense. If the
objective is to inform a common sense and practical determination of
probable cause, an overwhelming indication that the informant's tip
is based on inside and intimate access to the alleged criminal activity,
validated by independent police corroboration, effectively selfvalidates the veracity requirement. 206 In other words, when it is
established that the tip is based on a clear and compelling basis of
knowledge, that basis itself provides sufficient indicia of veracity.
Thus, as the Gates Court concluded, the totality approach better
served the objectives of assessing probable cause: it permits the
overwhelming satisfaction of one element to offset a reduced quanta
of indicia on the other element,2 07 an outcome that is impossible if
each element is treated as a strictly independent requirement.

204.
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The authors' changes are indicated in italics.
205.
See id. at 229 (noting that an anonymous letter alone would not satisfy the
two-pronged test regardless of how detailed and predictive the information might be,
because of an inability to assess the informant's veracity).
206.
See id. at 241-42 ("[A]n officer 'may rely upon information received through
an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's
statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge."'
(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960))).
207.
See id. at 237-38 (noting the benefits of the totality approach over the twopronged approach).
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B. UnderstandingIntensity and Organizationas a Framework
Whether and when a state is justified in resorting to combat
power to respond to an internal dissident threat is undoubtedly a
complex question. The Commentary is clear that recognition of an
internal armed conflict is in no way intended to legitimize the
opposition or its use of force.20 8 However, what history seems to
demonstrate repeatedly is that states almost always tend to err on
the side of aggressiveness when they feel threatened by dissident
movements. 209 This is unsurprising. A state seeking to preserve its
warrant will almost always perceive even a nascent and poorly
organized armed opposition movement as a critical national security
challenge. From an operational and tactical perspective, it is often
precisely at this point in the threat evolution that a massive and
heavy-handed combat response will be perceived as decisive.
Expecting the state to calmly wait for the opposition to coalesce into
an organized force capable of sustained combat operations before it
makes maximum use of its almost always (at least initially) superior
capability is simply counterintuitive.
Proponents of a strict elements test for conflict recognition
emphasize that until these requirements are satisfied, government

208.

This clause is essential. Without it Article 3 would probably never have
been adopted. It meets the fear that the application of the Convention,
even to a very limited extent, in cases of civil war may interfere with
the de jure Government's suppression of the revolt by conferring
belligerent status, and consequently increased authority and power,
upon the adverse Party. ... Consequently, the fact of applying Article
3 does not in itself constitute any recognition by the de jure
Government that the adverse Party has authority of any kind; it does
not limit in any way the Government's right to suppress a rebellion by
all the means-including arms-provided by its own laws; nor does it
in any way affect that Government's right to prosecute, try and
sentence its adversaries, according to its own laws.
In the same way, the fact of the adverse Party applying the Article
does not give it any right to any new international status, whatever it
may be and whatever title it may give itself or claim.

3 ICRC, supra note 7, at 43-44 (alteration in original).
209.
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: SILENCING
LABOR AND STUDENT UNIONS IN TUNISIA (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/

sites/default/files/reports/tunisialolow.pdf;

INT'L FED'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BAHRAIN:

GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN ON OPPOSITION CONSTITUTES A BLATANT HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATION (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/50b382785.html;
Manuel Noriega Must Face Justice in Panama Following Extradition,AMNESTY INT'L
(Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/manuel-noriega-must-facejustice-panama- following-extradition-2011-08-04; Ray Mosely & Howard Witt, Russian
Crisis Plays Out in a
Fiery Storm, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 5,
1993),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-10-05/news/9310050105-1ruslan-khasbulatovparliament-building-president-boris-yeltsin; Joe Stork, Mubarak Convicted, but Abuses
Continue in Egypt, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 10, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/
2012/06/10/mubarak-convicted-abuses-continue-egypt.
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forces are legally obligated to respond within a law enforcement legal
framework. 210 Perhaps if there was a viable method to strictly enforce
this consequence of the elements test, it would have greater merit,
but there is not. Instead, it borders on axiomatic that when the state
calls its combat-trained forces from the barracks to deal with an
internal opposition threat, those forces are going to operate in a
manner that maximizes their operational and tactical advantage.
Have there been exceptions to this norm? Of course. 211 But building a
humanitarian protection paradigm on the exception while ignoring
the rule is debilitating, and Syria is a quintessential manifestation of
this reality. First, the forces themselves enter the fray uncertain as to
the law that regulates their actions. As noted in the introduction, the
sad reality is that this will often be perceived not as limited
authority, but as authority with no limits. They will rarely see
themselves as robustly armed police-why would they be called out of
the barracks if that was what was needed? And yet, the constant
emphasis that the opposition is insufficiently organized to qualify as
a "real" enemy and that therefore they are not "really" in an armed
conflict will suggest that the only rule is rapid repression.2 1 2
This obviously creates uncertainty for the forces called upon to
respond to the opposition threat. But far more problematic is the
degradation of humanitarian protections applicable to the response.
Government forces will seek to exploit the nascent organization of
opposition or dissident movements with the application of
overwhelming force, creating a situation wholly unsuited for normal
peacetime legal regulation. In this context, issues such as lawful
objects of attack, precautions in the attack, minimization of collateral
damage, clear standards of protection for those rendered hors de
combat, protection for the wounded and sick, establishment of neutral
zones, and access to humanitarian relief become essential. These are

Philip Alston, Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
210.
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, T 31,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010).
See, e.g., Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, A Model for the 'War Against
211.
Terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew, 30
J.L. & SOC'Y 341 (2003) (discussing the UK response to the unrest in Northern
Ireland); Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Lessons in Command and Control from the Los
Angeles Riots, PARAMETERS, Summer 1997, at 88-109 (discussing the response by the
Los Angeles police and other authorities to the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles in
1992).
212.
See Samia Nakhoul, Fragmented Syria Opposition Emboldens Assad,
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/ussyria-opposition-idUSBRE82ROUT20120328 (noting that "even though the Assad
regime is under siege it is in a better position than it should be because the opposition
is in such disarray"); Syria's Assad Says Duty To 'Annihilate Terrorists," REUTERS
(June 28, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2012/06/28/us-syria-crisisassad-idUSBRE85R1D520120628.
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all aspects of conflict regulation derived from the LOAC, 2 13 yet
refusing to recognize the existence of armed conflict eviscerates the
efficacy of these norms by rendering them inapplicable.
In the conflict recognition context, therefore, the utility of the
Gates logic and emphasis on the totality of the circumstances is
apparent. In a situation with a relatively low intensity of hostilities,
indicia of opposition military organization would prove critical to a
practical determination of armed conflict. Without satisfaction of both
of these prongs, the low level of violence is itself insufficient to meet
the objective of the analysis; preventing premature LOAC invocation
and application to this situation is therefore best addressed through a
peacetime law enforcement framework and regulated exclusively by
human rights principles. The same result would be logical when an
opposition group was loosely organized, but had yet to engage in
action creating a significant intensity of violence. In that situation,
the inchoate nature of hostilities would justifiably indicate that
neither the state nor the opposition group had fully committed to
participation in an armed conflict.
But what if a situation exists in which the intensity of hostilities
element is overwhelmingly satisfied while the organizational element
is lacking? Under a strict application of the Tadid elements test, this
situation could never amount to an armed conflict. The discourse
about the situation in Syria makes this point all too clearly. But from
a pragmatic perspective, this conclusion seems inconsistent with the
humanitarian objectives of conflict recognition, precisely because the
overwhelming intensity of the hostilities brings one of LOAC's core
purposes-mitigating the brutality of and suffering during war-to
center stage. Indeed, a situation of intense hostilities without
significant opposition force organization indicates the exact type of
heavy-handed government military response that necessitates
humanitarian regulation. A full-blown use of military combat power
is precisely the type of government response that must be effectively
regulated, and the LOAC is far better suited to that purpose than
human rights law. 2 14 It is unfortunately all too common that the very
governments that resort to overwhelming combat power to repress
opposition are also unlikely to feel bound by any relevant human

See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
213.
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, arts. 51(b)(5),
52(2), 57, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (setting forth the principle of proportionality
and the definition of military objectives); GC I, supra note 21, art. 12 ("Members of the
armed forces and other persons mentioned in the following Article, who are wounded or
sick, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances."); GC II, supra note 21, art.
3(2) ('"he wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected and cared for."); GC IV,
supra note 21, arts. 15, 23 (requiring the establishment of neutral zones and access to
humanitarian relief).
214.
See supra Part I.
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rights obligations. 215 Suggesting that human rights law can provide
sufficient protection for those most in need in such circumstances is
simply burying one's head in the sand.
Furthermore, relying on a lack of opposition organization to deny
the existence of armed conflict and the applicability of this
incentivizes
effectively
framework
regulatory
international
indiscriminate brutality by the government. If, at the inception of an
opposition movement, the government responds with overwhelming
combat power, it may actually prevent organizational efforts, thereby
avoiding the consequences of LOAC applicability. 216 It may even
incentivize deliberate dispersal of opposition capabilities in an effort
to minimize indicia of organization and thereby undermine the
legitimacy of any state assertion of armed conflict. 217 Thus,
overwhelming satisfaction of the intensity prong should produce an
analogous effect to the overwhelming satisfaction of the basis prong
in the Gates model. Widespread and intense hostilities would offset
the requirement to identify significant opposition organization. While
some evidence of organization would be necessary, dispersed and

215.
See, e.g., Michael Slackman & Nadim Audi, Clashes Erupt in Bahrain as
Tumult Ripples Across Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A12; Thousands of
Egyptians Protest What They Call Police Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at A5;
1989: Massacre in Tiananmen Square, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uklonthisday/hildates/
stories/june/4/newsid_2496000/2496277.stm (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (U.K.); SyriaUprising and Civil War, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/internationall
countriesandterritories/syrialindex.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); Timeline: Egypt's
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/201 1/01/
JAZEERA,
AL
Revolution,
201112515334871490.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2011) (Qatar); Press Release, Victoria
Nuland, U.S. Dep't of State Dep't Spokesperson, U.S. Condemns Ongoing Violence in
http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2011/
available at
2011),
25,
(July
Syria
07/169069.htm; Press Release, Mark C. Toner, U.S. Dep't of State Deputy
Spokesperson, Message on the Twenty-Third Anniversary of Tiananmen Square (June
3, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pal prs/ps/2012/06/191692.htm.
It is not difficult to imagine that a government, concerned that an
216.
opposition movement is gaining momentum and capability to challenge the state by
force of arms, will perceive an early and heavy-handed response as ideal to prevent the
development of this capability and disrupt organizational efforts. An ideal illustration
of such a response was the Serbian reaction to the growing opposition movement in
Kosovo in 1998. Ostensibly unwilling to allow another former Yugoslav republic to
break away from the central government in Belgrade, President Slobodan Milogevi
ordered a military intervention before the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army could
develop an effective capacity to challenge government authority, resulting in a
humanitarian disaster. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNDER ORDERS: WAR CRIMES IN
KOSOVO ch. 4 (2001).
This totality of the circumstances analysis is equally valuable when
217.
addressing the status of military operations against transnational nonstate
organizations, especially when such organizations utilize dispersal and lack of
traditional belligerent organization as tactical force multipliers. This certainly seems to
be consistent with the continued U.S. assertion that it is engaged in an ongoing armed
conflict with al Qaeda. While this assertion remains as controversial today as it was at
inception, see ILA, supra note 52, it seems clear that it is the intensity of the risk and
continued terrorist threat that dominates this assessment, even as al Qaeda's
organization has been decimated.
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nascent movements would satisfy that requirement in the context of
such intensity. This approach also comports with the original
conception that while an armed conflict requires two parties fighting
against each other, some minimal degree of organization is sufficient
to conclude that two sides are engaged in combat. 218
The claim that the same result would be justified by
overwhelming satisfaction of the organization prong of the Tadi6 test
with little or no intensity of hostilities is a more difficult argument to
sustain. It is perhaps logical to infer the existence of armed conflict as
the result of a highly organized dissident force, for example a
breakaway military group preparing to initiate hostilities against the
government. In general, however, an inference of armed conflict
based on high organization and little or no intensity will be less
compelling than the inverse relationship between intensity and
organization. There are countless examples of highly organized and
peaceful opposition movements. 219 For example, opposition
movements to governments frequently are able to quickly organize
mass protests and other actions of civil disobedience. Examples such
as Tahrir Square in Egypt during that chapter of the Arab Spring, 220
or the civil disobedience efforts in Panama opposing General Manuel
Noriega leading up to the U.S. invasion, 22 1 illustrate that these
movements may at times attain a high level of organization.
However, it would be inconsistent with the Commentary's conception
of the civil/armed conflict threshold to suggest that organization, even
coupled with widespread activity in opposition to the government,
qualifies as an armed conflict. Unless and until that opposition
involves some significant level of violence-violence that triggers a
military response by the government utilizing the traditional tools
and tactics of combat-it does not meet the test for armed conflict,
even under a more flexible totality approach. 222 Some hostilities must

218.
See 4 ICRC, supra note 9, at 35-36 (noting that armed conflict that does not
match any of the examples provided in the Commentary would still be considered an
armed conflict, and reinforcing that the examples or criteria offered are "not obligatory
and are only mentioned as an indication").
219.
See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Bd. of Can., Argentina: Information on
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Doc. No. ARG10694 (May 1, 1992), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6abf940.html (describing the Association of
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, an organization formed around a silent vigil on April 30,
1977, in front of Argentina's government house by relatives of those who disappeared
during the military regime of that time); Kirit Radia, Thousands To Protest Against
Putin in Moscow in Final Demonstration Before Election, ABC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/02/thousands-to-protest-against-putin-inmoscow-in-final-demonstration-before-election/; Timeline: Egypt's Revolution, supra
note 215.
220.
See generally Timeline: Egypt's Revolution, supra note 215.
221.
See generally THOMAS DONELLY, MARGARET ROTH & CALEB BAKER,
OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE STORMING OF PANAMA (1991).

222.
See 4 ICRC, supranote 9, at 36 (noting that Common Article 3 conflicts are
"armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities").
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be necessary for a situation to qualify as an armed conflict-inherent
in the term armed-although it does seem logical to reduce the
intensity threshold when the evidence of organization is
overwhelming.
Interestingly, the Gates decision also offers an example of how
these inverse relationships might not justify the same conclusion. In
a concurring opinion, Justice White critiqued the majority's failure to
distinguish between the effect of overwhelming satisfaction of the
foundation
prong compared to the
inverse hypothetical:
overwhelming satisfaction of the veracity prong with no indicia of a
solid basis for the tip. 223 Justice White noted that in the latter
situation, it would be illogical to find probable cause because the
magistrate would have no independent basis for reaching that
finding. 224 Instead, it would simply reflect the ratification of an
opinion of criminality based on the veracity of the source of the
opinion. 225 Justice White also noted that it was inconceivable that a
magistrate would properly issue a warrant based solely on the
assurance of a police officer that evidence would be located where the
officer said it existed. 226 If, Justice White asked, this type of "trust
me" affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause, how could a
tip from a private citizen be considered sufficient? 227 Thus, Justice
White acknowledged that overwhelming satisfaction of the foundation

223.

Justice White noted:

The Court reasons that the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" tests are
not independent, and that a deficiency as to one can be compensated for by a
strong showing as to the other. Thus, a finding of probable cause may be based
on a tip from an informant "known for the unusual reliability of his predictions
or from an unquestionably honest citizen," even if the report fails thoroughly to
set forth the basis upon which the information was obtained. If this is so, then
it must follow a fortiori that "the affidavit of an officer, known by the
magistrate to be honest and experienced, stating that [contraband] is located in
a certain building" must be acceptable. It would be "quixotic" if a similar
statement from an honest informant, but not one from an honest officer, could
furnish probable cause. But we have repeatedly held that the unsupported
assertion or belief of an officer does not satisfy the probable cause
requirement....
Thus, as I read the majority opinion, it appears that the question whether
the probable cause standard is to be diluted is left to the common-sense
judgments of issuing magistrates. I am reluctant to approve any standard that
does not expressly require, as a prerequisite to issuance of a warrant, some
showing of facts from which an inference may be drawn that the informant is
credible and that his information was obtained in a reliable way.
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 272-73 (1983) (White J., concurring) (alteration in
original) (internal citations omitted).
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
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prong with little or no indicia of veracity as the result of the
anonymity of the informant might justify a finding of probable cause
because the magistrate could independently assess the foundation.2 2 8
In effect, as long as there is solid foundation, the magistrate has a
valid independent basis to assess the reliability of the tip. 229
However, when no indicia of foundation exist, a tip from even the
most trustworthy source-such as an experienced and trustworthy
police officer-would not alone establish probable cause. 230 Instead,
some foundation for the tip had to be provided, although a high level
of veracity could reduce the foundation requirement. 231
This bifurcated assessment model seems equally well-suited to
conflict recognition. As noted above, overwhelming satisfaction of the
intensity prong should reduce the requirement for established
opposition organization. 232 In contrast, overwhelming satisfaction of
the organization prong is analogous to overwhelming satisfaction of
veracity in Justice White's conception of the totality of the
circumstances test: it alone cannot eliminate the requirement for
some level of hostilities. 233 It would, however, permit a finding of
armed conflict at a much earlier point in the hostilities continuum.
This is a logical outcome, for it is the total effect of an opposition
group poised to engage in hostilities-as manifested through indicia
of organization-combined with the initiation of those hostilities that
indicates the initiation of armed conflict.
In comparing the two possible examples-high intensity with low
organization, or high organization with low intensity-one can see
why a more comprehensive totality of the circumstances approach is
essential to the pragmatic and operationally effective application of
the LOAC. No two situations of violence are the same and no two will
pose the same questions regarding the nature of the hostilities and
the capacity of the opposition forces. Recognizing this diversity; its
consequences for conflict recognition; and the need to analyze
intensity, organization, and other relevant factors within a
comprehensive framework helps to ensure a more practical
application of the LOAC trigger in Common Article 3. Analogy to the
Gates opinion is merely offered as a means of highlighting the
dangers of allowing elements to evolve into strict independent
requirements and the benefits of a more flexible understanding of
those elements, especially how they interrelate. If doing so better
reconciles armed conflict recognition with the underlying

228.
See id. at 270 n.22 (discussing the possibility that corroborating facts might
satisfy both prongs).
229.
Id. at 271.
230.
Id. at 273.
231.
See id. at 272-73 ("[An] unsupported assertion ... does not satisfy the
probable-cause requirement." (citation omitted)).
232.
See supra notes 213-218 and accompanying text.

233.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 273-74 (1983).
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humanitarian objectives of the LOAC, this methodology will better
serve the interests of all those affected by intrastate violence.

IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Like all legal regimes, the LOAC requires thorough legal
analysis and, as a result, can be susceptible to overly legalistic
approaches. It is essential, however, to constantly emphasize that the
LOAC addresses life and death, and in the starkest manner possible.
This is a body of law that recognizes the right of warring parties to
destroy enemy personnel and property, accepts incidental civilian
casualties (in accordance with the principle of proportionality), and
regulates lethal weapons, among a host of other components of the
law. 234 Its protections focus equally on the most fundamental of
human needs: protection from attack, care for the wounded, respect
for the dead, protection for medical personnel and facilities, and
more. 23 5 The LOAC-and especially applicability analysis-is
ultimately undermined when technicalities inhibit the realization of
its core purposes and protections. Indeed, the consequences of overly
narrow or inapt application are simply too great to contemplate.
In addition, the LOAC has a long tradition of relying on the
object and purpose of the law in response to changing circumstances
and uncertainties. As Jean Pictet wrote in 1985:
The international Conventions contain a multitude of rules which
specify the obligations of states in very precise terms, but this is not the
whole story. Behind these rules are a number of principles which
inspire the entire substance of the documents....
... They serve in a sense as the bone structure in a living body,
providing guidelines in unforeseen cases and constituting a complete
summary of the whole, easy to understand and indispensable for the
purposes of dissemination.236

The LOAC's basic principles-military necessity, humanity,
distinction,
and proportionality-have
thus
always guided
interpretations to preserve and protect the law's core values. 237 In
much the same way, the LOAC's essential purposes, including
mitigating the brutality and suffering of war, have a similar role to
play, especially in the realm of conflict recognition. Just as reliance

234.
235.

See generally Corn & Blank, supra note 20.
See id at 109.

236.
JEAN
PICTET, DEVELOPMENT
HUMANITARIAN LAW 59 (1985).
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237.
See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
96-127 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (discussing the growing application in internal armed conflict
of LOAC principles and rules originally drafted for and applicable in international
armed conflicts).
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on the LOAC's basic principles helps protect against interpretations
of the law that undermine their goals, so a reminder of the LOAC's
historic purpose must drive a recalibration of the conflict recognition
process from one of technical legalities to one of a totality of the
circumstances aimed at a pragmatic protective framework. If not,
Syria serves as an all too tragic reminder of the danger of not seeing
the forest for the trees.

